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Road users fail to realize their role in congestion.  This thesis aims to calculate 
the appropriate charges required for users of I-495 – the Capital Beltway surrounding 
Washington, D.C. – in order to fulfill their portion of congestion costs.  By 
developing a model from existing data that showcases traffic characteristics causing 
congestion, the user charges necessary to cause drivers to realize the congestion costs 
that their vehicles impose on the rest of the traffic stream are determined. 
This study concludes that under typical traffic flow conditions for the Capital 
Beltway, charges ranging from $0.03 to $0.08 per passenger car equivalent (PCE) per 
mile during AM and PM peak periods cause drivers to realize their contribution to 
congestion costs.  These results are lower than the $0.08 to $0.50 per-mile charges 
that previous research has estimated.  As vehicles occupy various amounts of road 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Traffic congestion is the topic of daily news broadcasts, water cooler horror 
stories and mounting frustration nationwide.  As slower driving speeds, increased 
queuing and worsened travel reliability take center stage, we are left wondering what 
led to this condition and, more importantly, where we can turn for relief. 
Traffic congestion is a familiar problem around the world, especially for those 
in urban areas.  Congestion affects everyone and is usually defined in terms of excess 
vehicles on a portion of roadway at a certain time that results in speeds that are slower 
than free-flow conditions.  At its most basic level, the consequence of failing to 
effectively manage the capacity of a roadway system results in congestion.  Road 
capacity has not grown as quickly as road use – between 1990 and 2005, for example, 
vehicle-miles traveled increased by 44 percent, while highway lane miles only 
increased 4 percent (FHWA 2005, 1990).  It goes without saying that if vehicle-miles 
traveled have increased at a rate much greater than that of the construction of new 
highway lanes, congestion has been a direct result. 
Among professionals, metropolitan traffic congestion is often deemed the 
single most critical issue we face today in the transportation industry – an idea that is 
slowly being expressed by government figures across the country.  According to the 
Texas Transportation Institute’s 2007 Urban Mobility Report, congestion in 
America’s urban areas is estimated to cost approximately $78 billion per year in 





Americans see reductions in both quality of life (reduced air quality, less time with 
family and friends, etc.) and productivity.  Industry costs relating to the movement of 
goods by truck are rising.  Congestion in the United States is affecting more roads for 
more people – it is estimated that the average weekday peak period trip takes almost 
40 percent longer than an identical off-peak trip; this compares to only a 13 percent 
increase in 1982 (Dodgson 2006).  AM and PM peak periods have also expanded.  In 
larger cities, drivers spend the equivalent of almost 8 work days each year stuck in 
traffic (Paniati 2006) and the situation is only escalating – the duration, extent and 
intensity of congestion is increasing annually. 
It must be noted in this discussion that congestion is not viewed only in 
negative light – there are some who consider traffic congestion to be an inherent sign 
of success.  More or less, people want to be where opportunities are located and, 
often, when the automobile is the dominant mode choice, congestion is a result.  
While it is true that a different spin can be placed on any situation, the impact of 
congestion on urban areas at the local, regional and national level cannot be refuted.  
Effective, accessible transportation networks are key instruments in enhancing quality 
of life and, for this reason, congestion issues need to be addressed instead of ignored. 
Many analysts believe that efficient transportation depends more on managing 
existing demand than on adding new supply (Victoria Transport Policy Institute 
2007).  The fact that vehicle-miles traveled are increasing at a rate far greater than 
roadway construction is evidence that we cannot possibly build our way out of 
congestion.  Studies have shown that 60-90% of new road capacity is anticipated to 





traffic) comes with added capacity (Replogle 2007).  This is not surprising, as traffic 
attempts to flow along the path of least resistance – if new roads or lanes are 
constructed, more people will choose to utilize these paths until the level of 
congestion returns to its previous state, at which time users will choose alternate 
routes. 
Travel is mainly a derived demand, meaning it is usually demanded not for its 
own sake but as a means of consuming some other good or service or to participate in 
economic activities (i.e. work).  Because the activities with which transportation is 
associated vary over time, the demand for travel is not constant over time.  For 
example, many towns and cities experience traffic congestion during peak morning 
and evening commuting times, and holiday routes experience seasonal congestion 
(Button 2004).  Traffic demand has to be adjusted in order to make any tangible 
difference. 
A key tool for such demand management is user charges (i.e. pricing).  In 
concept, the ideal form of pricing is congestion pricing, which charges highway users 
based on their contribution to highway congestion, which means that the charges are 
specific to both a place and a time.  Transportation is over-consumed as a direct result 
of inadequate pricing.  If priced properly, fewer miles will be driven per vehicle and 
less transportation will be consumed.  Congestion pricing is currently the source of 
heated political debate regarding potential congestion solutions and aims to adjust 
traffic demand in order to alleviate traffic congestion qualms.  Further, there is 
consensus among economists that congestion pricing represents the single most viable 





leads to congestion, which is detrimental to all users.  Congestion pricing is a way of 
ensuring that those using valuable and congested road space make a financial 
contribution, encourages the use of other transportation modes and is intended to 
ensure that, for those who have (or choose) to use the roadways, trip times are faster 
and more reliable.   
Critics argue that users pay for their road usage through gas tax revenue – 
generated from the levy imposed on the per-gallon sale of motor fuels at both the 
state and federal levels.  While this idea is not totally discredited, current gas tax 
revenue figures are not enough to justify the amount of road usage that is occurring in 
our society.  In many states, gas taxes have not been raised since the early 1990s and 
when they happen to be raised, it is generally not enough to keep up with inflation.  In 
fact, twenty-eight states have raised their gas tax rates since 1992, but only three have 
raised it enough to keep pace with inflation (Brookings Institute 2003).  The public 
tends to unknowingly think that their annual contribution to the gas tax is much 
greater than it actually is.  On average, between $500 and $600 is paid per vehicle per 
year towards the gas tax – less than most annual cable television bills. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Most people fail to consider the adverse effect that their traveling places on 
others – it is the aim of this thesis to address and explore this inadequacy.  Many road 
users have come to believe that they currently own the right to travel freely and 
uninterrupted and that roadways are provided exclusively in order for them to achieve 
this goal.  Only by attaching a usage-based price to travel habits will drivers 





commodity, in the same light as public utilities (telephone and electric services), 
movie tickets or airline pricing, where the price of the services are usage-based and 
increase as the demand increases over a certain threshold.  Companies in these fields 
have used peak period pricing for years – why shouldn’t transportation agencies do 
the same? 
In this region, traffic congestion is a daily concern on I-495, surrounding 
Washington, D.C.  Figure 1-1 shows this roadway in context of the region.  Correct 
user pricing for all lanes of I-495 would ultimately be beneficial to society.  It is 
important that the optimal price is determined, as incorrect pricing can have an 
adverse effect on the economy and inadequate pricing will fail to curb demand. 
 






1.3 Research Objectives 
Due to the aforementioned fact that travelers fail to realize their role in 
congestion, the goal of this thesis is to calculate the appropriate charges required for 
users of I-495 – the Capital Beltway surrounding Washington, D.C. – in order to 
fulfill their portion of congestion costs.  The first objective is to develop a model from 
existing data that showcases traffic characteristics that cause congestion, in addition 
to the results of such interactions.  Secondly, the charges necessary to cause vehicle 
users to realize the congestion costs that their vehicles impose on the rest of the traffic 
stream will be determined.  This will be accomplished using prior methodology set 
forth by Gabriel Roth and Olegario Villoria (2001).  The contribution of this thesis 
lies not in the method itself, but by examining the model in the context of a freeway 
(I-495) instead of city streets.  The third objective of this thesis is to examine the 
potential financial implications (costs and revenue) that would be associated with the 
proposed congestion pricing system on I-495. 
1.4 Document Organization 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters and one ancillary appendix.  The 
previous sections of Chapter 1 contained introductory information regarding traffic 
congestion and described the purpose and scope of this work.  Chapter 2 serves as a 
review of existing literature applicable to this thesis, including information on 
congestion/road pricing theory, implementation, and studies.  Chapter 3 introduces 
the proposed method behind this thesis and the entire model formulation is set forth in 





model, is also discussed.  Drawing upon the aforementioned work by Roth and 
Villoria, data from detector locations on the Capital Beltway, dating back to 2002, are 
examined.  Chapter 4 provides an evaluation of the proposed system, along with a 
demonstration of the model.  Based on this evaluation, optimal pricing ranging from 
$0.03 to $0.08 per mile for each passenger car is obtained.  Results of applicable 
sensitivity analysis are also set forth in this chapter.  Chapter 5 outlines potential 
implementation of the proposed congestion pricing strategy and includes information 
on current technology, equity considerations, and policy limitations.  The financial 
implications of such a system are provided in Chapter 6, with multiple setup scenarios 
being examined and corresponding costs and revenue examined.  The benefits and 
challenges associated with the system are discussed and system payoff and break-
even points are addressed.  Chapter 7 summarizes the results of the thesis and 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
In terms of summarizing existing literature applicable to this thesis, there are 
numerous aspects of congestion/road pricing that are deserving of discussion.  The 
following sections touch on a varied selection of topics, including congestion pricing 
theory, implementation, and studies. 
2.1 Congestion Pricing Background/Theory 
 “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,” written by 
Adam Smith in 1776, is widely considered to be the first modern work in the field of 
economics.  Included is the following passage which deduces that road users should 
pay in accordance with their usage (i.e. the magnitude of the road damage they 
cause): 
“When the carriages which pass over a highway or a bridge (...) pay toll in 
proportion to their weight or their tonnage, they pay for the maintenance of 
those public works exactly in proportion to the wear and tear which they 
occasion of them.  It seems scarce possible to invent a more equitable way of 
maintaining such works.  This tax or toll too, though it is advanced by the 
carrier, is finally paid by the consumer, to whom it must always be charged in 
the price of the goods. (...) His payment is exactly in proportion to his gain.  It 
is in reality no more than a part of that gain which he is obliged to give up in 
order to get the rest.  It seems impossible to imagine a more equitable method 
(Smith 307).” 
 
Following Smith’s idea of charging road users appropriately leads to the idea of 
congestion pricing.  Lindsey and Verhoef (2000) contend that the insight for 
congestion pricing comes from the observation that people tend to make socially 
efficient choices when they are faced with all the social benefits and costs of their 





means of alleviating traffic congestion, because it employs the price mechanism, with 
all its advantages of clarity, universality, and efficiency. 
Based on writings such as those by Lindsey and Verhoef (2000), an early 
history of congestion pricing can be determined.  In the 1920s, Arthur Cecil Pigou 
and Frank Knight were the first advocates of theoretical congestion pricing.  It was 
William Vickrey in the 1960s, however, who wholeheartedly promoted congestion 
pricing and was the most influential in making the case on both theoretical and 
practical grounds.  Vickrey identified the potential for road pricing to influence 
travelers’ choice of route and travel mode and his work makes clear that true 
congestion pricing entails setting tolls that match the severity of congestion, which 
requires that tolls vary according to time, location, type of vehicle, and current 
circumstances.  Additionally, Vickrey was the first to put forward an operational plan 
for road pricing in a specific city (Washington, D.C.) and was steadfast in promoting 
the idea of congestion pricing to non-economists.  Since this time, several strategies 
for the implementation of congestion pricing have emerged. 
The four main types of congestion pricing strategies are as follows (FHWA 
2001): 
• Variably priced / managed lanes – involve variable tolls on separated 
lanes within a highway, such as Express Toll Lanes or High Occupancy or 
Toll (HOT) Lanes.  HOT lanes allow low-occupancy vehicles to pay a 
variable toll to use the lanes, while high-occupancy vehicles are allowed to 





• Variable tolls on entire roadways or smaller sections – both on toll roads 
and bridges, as well as on existing toll-free facilities during rush hours.  
This strategy raises existing tolls in peak periods and possibly reduces 
them in off-peak periods. 
• Cordon charges – either variable or fixed charges to drive within or into a 
congested area within a city 
• Area-wide charges – per-mile charges on all roads within an area that may 
vary by level of congestion 
In all of these cases, to truly merit the title of congestion pricing, an implementation 
strategy must contain a time-of-day element due to the fact that usage varies with 
peak periods.  This thesis provides area-wide pricing for an entire facility. 
Historically, it is possible to identify at least three periods in which policy 
measures to curb congestion have emerged (Salomon and Mokhtarian 1997).  
Through the mid-1960s, the principal tool was expansion of infrastructure (i.e. 
building more roads to accommodate demand).  In the 1970s, there was a shift toward 
improved management of the available infrastructure – Transportation Systems 
Management (TSM).  In the early 1980s, there was an increasing realization that 
altering human behavior was the next necessary step.  This led to the development 
and implementation of Transportation Demand Management (TDM) strategies, 
involving a wide range of policies to reduce dependence on the single-occupant 
automobile.  The first two periods can be characterized as emphasizing supply-side 
measures, while the third is designed to affect demand.  Congestion pricing is a 





Mokhtarian (1997) also note that with a growing concern for environmental costs, the 
focus on congestion mitigation is also growing as congestion traffic produces more 
air pollutants than smooth traffic flow, involves more noise production, and consumes 
more energy.  Thus, both the individual and society coincide in their perception of the 
presence of a problem but not so, however, in assessing the means for solution.  
Additionally, trends over the last two decades have demonstrated that little is 
accomplished by the variety of measures devised to reduce congestion. 
Figure 2-1 shows a theoretical congestion pricing model, as exhibited by 
McMullen (1993).  The uncongested road pricing situation is shown as demand curve 
D1, the distance OA represents vehicle costs such as fuel, oil, vehicle wear and tear, 
and the driver’s value of time, and the costs incurred by the road operation agency 
(road maintenance, policing, etc.) are shown as the distance AB.  The horizontal line 
BH represents both average total cost (AC) and marginal cost (MC) up to road 
volume C – the roadway is not congested between O and C and, therefore, each 
additional vehicle trip incurs the same marginal cost as the previous one. 
When demand is at D1, the optimal user charge is AB, which results in an 
optimal traffic level of Q0.  After encountering congestion at traffic volume C, 
additional vehicle trip imposes a cost (i.e. increased travel time) on other vehicles – 
for this reason, the average total and marginal costs diverge at greater volumes.  At 
demand level D2, the roadway is congested and the optimal user charge would be 
GD+DE, where DE is the congestion fee. 
This theoretical model infers that the main reason for excessive congestion is 





hours (McMullen 1993).  This model is simplistic in that it ignores the numerous 
different vehicle types that utilize the same road space – this would suggest higher 
peak hour congest fees for trucks and other large vehicles. 
 
Figure 2-1: Theoretical Congestion Pricing Model 
Lastly, elasticity is a term often used in the economics world, but likely to be 
misunderstood in the transportation realm.  In simplest terms, elasticity refers to the 
amount of change in a dependent variable as a result of changes in an independent 
variable.  For the purpose of this study, changes in road use as a result of increased 
costs (i.e. charging) are the focus. 
2.1.1 Traffic Flow Theory 
While discussing congestion pricing theory, it is important to mention some 





theory, the topic most closely related to this specific study is the relationship between 
traffic flow and traffic speed.  Greenshield (1935) developed a linear model of speed 
and density, which can be interpreted into the speed-flow relationship shown in 
Figure 2-2. 
 
Figure 2-2: Greenshield’s Model – Speed-Flow Relationship 
The Highway Capacity Manual (Transportation Research Board 2000) does 
not portray the region of unstable/uncertain flow where the above curve wraps back 
around itself.  This unpredictable area is referred to as hypercongestion (shown in 
Figure 2-2) and results in a loss of capacity due to the breakdown of traffic flow.  The 
HCM speed-flow curves for basic freeway segments are exhibited as Figure 2-3.  
When comparing Greenshield’s model to the HCM representation, a few differences 
are evident.  The area of unstable flow (hypercongestion) is removed and due to the 
fact that speeds remain relatively constant at low volumes, the HCM shows the top of 
the curve as perfectly horizontal before the effects of higher flow levels begin to 
reduce speeds.  In sum, the current HCM speed-flow relationship can be broken down 
into two sections: an unchanging constant portion at low flows (represented by the 






Figure 2-3: Speed-Flow Curves for Basic Freeway Segments 
Source: HCM 2000 – Exhibit 23-3 
2.2 Implementation 
Congestion pricing is more prominent abroad than in the United States.  
Systems of varying technological levels have been operating since 1975 in Singapore 
and automated systems have been operating full-time in London and Stockholm since 
2003 and 2007, respectively, in addition to various other examples in other areas. 
In London, a charge is collected when a vehicle enters the central city area on 
weekdays between 7:00AM and 6:00PM – no per-mile charges are assessed.  The 
standard daily charge is £8 ($16 US) if paid by midnight on the day of travel.  The 
charge is increased to £10 ($20 US) if paid by midnight the following day.  The initial 
charge for the strategy was £5 ($10 US), but increased to £8 ($16 US) in July 2005 
(Transport for London).  Based on results provided by Mayor Ken Livingstone 
(2007), after London put its initial congestion charging zone into place, it led to an 
immediate drop of 70,000 cars per day in the affected zone.  Traffic congestion fell 





more than 15 percent.  The retail sector in the zone has seen increases in sales that 
have significantly exceeded the national average.  People are still traveling in London 
– they are simply doing so in more efficient and less polluting ways.  There has been 
a marked shift away from cars and into public transport and environmentally friendly 
modes of travel.  There has been a 4 percent modal shift into use of public transport 
from private cars since 2000.  Simultaneously, the number of bicycle journeys on 
London's major roads has risen by 83 percent, to almost half a million per day.  
London's pricing scheme has been estimated to produce savings of about 0.7 minutes 
per kilometer, or 1.13 minutes per mile (Transport for London 2007). 
In Stockholm, a congestion charge is imposed on Swedish registered vehicles 
driving into and out of the Stockholm inner city zone on weekdays between 6:30AM 
and 6:29PM and each passage into or out of the inner city zone costs SEK 10, 15 or 
20 ($1.58 – $3.15 US), depending on the time of day.  The accumulated passages 
made by any vehicle during a particular day are aggregated and the maximum amount 
charged per day and vehicle is SEK 60 ($9.45 US).  As the Stockholm scheme was 
only implemented in mid-2007, not much actual data has become available.  
Therefore, the effectiveness of the scheme has been based on the Stockholm trial 
period that occurred before actual implementation commenced.  As a result of 
congestion charging in Stockholm (Stockholmsförsöket 2006): 
• Motor traffic decreased 22% over 24 hours 






• Traffic reductions lead to less environmental impact and better health, as 
emissions from motor vehicles account for a large proportion of the total 
pollution in the city 
• Public transport usage increased 
• Road safety improved as a result of reduced traffic 
Focus will shift now to implementations in the United States, as the political climate 
for congestion pricing differs greatly from the aforementioned regions. 
The USDOT has entered into Urban Partnership Agreements with five cities, 
in accordance with their commitment to, among other things, implement broad 
congestion pricing.  The five cities are: Miami, Minneapolis/St. Paul, New York City, 
San Francisco, and Seattle (Lake Washington).  These agreements represent the 
future of congestion pricing in the United States, as future strategies will be based on 
the actual implementation and success of these proposed systems.  At the time of this 
study, much debate is currently centered on the proposed congestion pricing strategy 
in New York City that has recently been voted down. 
While the Washington, D.C. area is not one of the USDOT pilot areas, the 
first of a network of HOT lanes in Virginia could potentially open in just two years, 
and the variably-tolled intercounty connector in Maryland is scheduled for 
completion by 2012.  Additionally, the state of Oregon is in the process of developing 
GPS-based distance measurements to replace the fuel taxes it now uses to pay for 
road usage.  At the onset, Oregon would not require all vehicles to have the GPS 






Sullivan (2003) notes that in the mid-1970s, the federal government offered 
funds to U.S. cities willing to try a pricing scheme to reduce congestion.  Although 
some implementation studies that produced findings favorable to the concept were 
conducted, all of these early initiatives failed, largely due to local community 
opposition.  In 1991, the U.S. Congress passed a surface transportation act called the 
“Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA).”  This act created the 
U.S. Congestion Pricing Pilot program, which directed the USDOT to help develop 
and fund congestion pricing pilot projects.  In 1998, this program was renamed the 
“Value Pricing Pilot Program.” 
A common feature of value pricing projects is that pricing (i.e. the toll) varies 
with the time of day, in an effort to encourage traffic to shift away from peak periods.  
Tolls on value pricing facilities are generally determined by the responsible operating 
authorities, which include private companies, state DOTs, and regional government 
agencies – toll-setting by government agencies involves due process, including public 
comment.  At the national level, it was recognized that using the rather academic title 
“Congestion Pricing” elicited negative emotions.  Switching to “Value Pricing” 
provided a more positive way to identify the same notion – additionally, toll 
collection technologies are usually identified using positive labels, such as “Fastrak,” 
“QuickRide,” or “E-ZPass (Sullivan).”  
2.3 Studies 
Many studies have taken place involving the numerous facets of congestion 





user responses relating to congestion, which showcase the various options that 
travelers have in regards to potential congestion pricing: 
1) Accommodate congestion costs/do nothing 
2) Reduce congestion costs 
3) Change departure time 
4) Change route 
5) Buy time 
6) Invest in productivity-enhancing technology at home 
7) Adopt flextime 
8) Adopt compressed work week 
9) Change mode of travel 
10) Telecommute from home 
11) Telecommute from a telecenter 
12) Change workplace 
13) Relocate home 
14) Change from full-time to part-time work 
15) Start a home-based business 
16) Quit work 
A system of “first-best” pricing sets tolls to completely match the external 
costs generated by each traveler.  This is accomplished by having variable charges 
that change in real-time with existing conditions.  Although useful in a theoretical 
sense, “first-best” pricing has limited practicality.  “Second-best” congestion pricing 





applicable charges in advance.  This includes the use of step-tolls instead of smoothly 
time-varying tolls or tolling according to a fixed daily schedule rather than day-
specific traffic conditions (Lindsey and Verhoef 2000).  Table 2-1 ranks common 
vehicle charging options in terms of how well they represent the costs imposed by a 
particular vehicle trip (Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2007). 
Table 2-1: Common Vehicle Charging Options 
Rank General Category Examples 
Best 
Time- and location-specific 
road and parking pricing 
Variable road pricing, location-specific parking 




Weight-distance charges, mileage-based vehicle 
insurance, prorated motor vehicle excise tax, 
mileage based emission charges 
Third Best Fuel charges 
Increase fuel tax, apply general sales tax to fuel, 
pay-at-the-pump insurance, carbon tax, increase 
hazardous substance tax 
Bad Fixed vehicle charges 
Current motor vehicle excise tax, vehicle 
purchase and ownership fees 
Worst 
External costs (not charged 
to motorists) 
General taxes paying for roads and traffic 
services, parking subsidies, uncompensated 
external costs 
 
As congestion pricing is quite controversial, Jones (1998) outlined potential 
reasons for opposing congestion pricing: 
• Drivers find it difficult to accept the idea of being charged for something 
they wish to avoid (congestion) and also feel that congestion is not their 
fault, but rather something that is imposed on them by others 
• Road pricing is not needed, either because congestion is not bad enough or 
because other measures are superior 
• Pricing will not get people out of their cars 
• The technology will not work 
• Privacy concerns 





• Road pricing is just another form of taxation 
• Perceived unfairness 
Two critical questions generated by the idea of congestion pricing focus on 
the optimal user charge amount and the effectiveness of the system.  In terms of 
actual per-mile charge estimates, McMullen (1993) shares that previous research has 
estimated that, in 2007 amounts, efficient peak-period tolls in the range of $0.08 to 
$0.50 per mile are appropriate.  The effectiveness question is answered by the 
aforementioned idea of elasticity.  Based on studies by Oum et al. (1992), changes in 
road use as a result of increased costs are consistent with elasticities of -0.5 or less.  
Additionally, results from strategies in locations such as Stockholm are more 
consistent with an approximate elasticity of -0.2 (Victoria Transport Policy Institute 
2007).  A negative elasticity indicates that an increase in road pricing is associated 
with a decrease in demand/usage.  Unfortunately, this value cannot be determined in 
advance of actual congestion pricing imposition.  For this thesis specifically, the 
elasticity estimate shows how well a pricing strategy actually works.  As an example, 
a price elasticity of -0.2 means that for every 10% increase in road user charges, a 2% 
reduction in road usage occurs. 
Sullivan (2003) concludes that forward momentum has been established for 
innovative road pricing, but future progress toward more widespread use of 
congestion-based pricing is likely to take advantage of local opportunities which 
present themselves, and will proceed cautiously.  Considerable emphasis will be 
placed on marketing strategies in order to win consumer acceptance.  By preventing 





congestion pricing maximizes the return on the public’s investment in highway 
facilities.  Society as a whole also benefits by reducing fuel consumption and vehicle 
emissions and allowing more efficient land use decisions (FWHA 2001). 
2.4 Closing Remarks 
 The provided information in this chapter helps to set the framework for this 
Capital Beltway study.  Area-wide congestion pricing has been shown as a successful 
strategy in various parts of the world, but few implementations are operating or being 
discussed in the United States.  This thesis fills a practical gap in the Washington, 
D.C. area – especially as congestion pricing is being considered on the horizon.  As 






Chapter 3: Methods and Data 
3.1 Introduction 
This study proposes a method to calculate the appropriate charges required for 
users of the Capital Beltway in order to fulfill their portion of congestion costs and is 
based upon previous methodology developed by Roth and Villoria (2001).  These 
charges are calculated through the use of an optimization model.  The method is 
based primarily on the relationship between traffic speed and traffic flow, from which 
delay calculations are determined. 
3.2 Proposed Method 
This study aims to determine the charge necessary to cause drivers to realize 
their congestion costs.  The proposed method is illustrated, in the form of a flowchart, 
in Figure 3-1 and each step is discussed in-depth. 
The first step in this method is to define the study area.  I-495, the Capital 
Beltway that surrounds Washington, D.C., is an ideal candidate due to the fact that it 
exhibits recurring AM and PM peak period congestion problems.  This area was 
shown in context of the region in Figure 1-1.  As the only circumferential roadway in 
the area, many key routes connect to the Capital Beltway along its 64 mile length, 
providing a critical highway link to other transportation services, including three 
regional airports, transit and rail facilities, and port terminals.  Due to this 
connectivity with other transportation facilities in the area, traffic congestion on I-495 





travel in both directions.  In accordance with other locations that have implemented 
congestion pricing, the Washington, D.C. area exhibits severe traffic congestion.  Key 
interchanges are consistently acknowledged as areas of overwhelming congestion and 
even though some travel alternatives exist, the automobile is the dominant mode. 
 




2. Examine traffic congestion 




3. Convert congestion 




4. Determine basis 









6. Analyze financial  
implications 
 
Figure 3-1: Proposed Method 
Secondly, traffic congestion is examined using the relationship between traffic 
flow and traffic speed – this approach is utilized within the Highway Capacity 
Manual (Transportation Research Board 2000).   In a strictly hypothetical sense, as 





relationship between traffic flow and traffic speed enables the calculation of delay 
imposed by users on other vehicles on the roadway.  Specific details on developing 
and expanding on this speed-flow relationship will be discussed as part of the model 
formation later in this chapter. 
Next, any applicable congestion data, such as delay imposed, should be 
converted into dollar values.  This is done by estimating user value of time and 
operating costs for the vehicles on the Capital Beltway. 
The fourth step in this method is to determine the basis for calculating user 
charges.  As different vehicles consume varying amounts of road space, it would be 
unjust to impose equal charges to every user.  Using the Federal Highway 
Administration’s (FHWA) vehicle classification system (shown below as Figure 3-2) 
and average vehicle lengths, estimates of passenger car equivalents (PCE) for each 
vehicle classification can be determined.  This table of information is included as 





















1 Motorcycle 6 0.38 
2 Passenger Cars 16 1.00 
3 Other Two-Axle, Four-Tire single Unit Vehicles 18 1.13 
4 Buses 38 2.38 
5 Two-Axle, Six-Tire, Single-Unit Trucks 26 1.63 
6 Three-Axle Single-Unit Trucks 25 1.56 
7 Four or More Axle Single-Unit Trucks 32 2.00 
8 Four or Fewer Axle Single-Trailer Trucks 44 2.75 
9 Five-Axle Single-Trailer Trucks 64 4.00 
10 Six or More Axle Single-Trailer Trucks 63 3.94 
11 Five or Fewer Axle Multi-Trailer Trucks 68 4.25 
12 Six-Axle Multi-Trailer Trucks 73 4.56 
13 Seven or More Axle Multi-Trailer Trucks 69 4.31 
 
The fifth step in this method is to create an optimization model.  For the 
purposes of this study, the model will be created using the Solver tool in Microsoft 
Excel.  In a nutshell, Excel Solver generates specific values (i.e. charges) to optimize 
a certain objective.  In the case of this study, the optimized variable is the dollar 
amount that users of I-495 should be charged per-mile. 
Lastly, the financial implications of user-based charging on the Capital 
Beltway will be analyzed.  Estimates of potential costs and revenue will be examined 
in order to provide information on this feasibility aspect. 
3.3 Methodology 
This section focuses on formulating the model used in this thesis.  The 
following main points will be addressed: 
• The process of obtaining usable data for this study 





• Using the relationship between traffic speed and traffic flow to perform 
delay calculations 
• Applying relevant user value of time and vehicle operating cost 
estimations to setup the model to optimize congestion charges for the 
Capital Beltway 
3.3.1 Data 
The first stage of this thesis involved obtaining I-495 detector data for use in 
the study.  When contacting the Maryland State Highway Administration (MD SHA) 
and the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT), the following main 
components of desired data were expressed: 
• Detector locations on I-495 in Maryland or Virginia 
• Permanent detection stations reporting data in intervals less than or equal 
to one hour for all hours of the day 
• Volume count information (both total counts and counts broken down by 
FHWA vehicle classification) 
• Vehicle speed information 
• Data archived for multiple years 
In-road detectors (i.e. loop detectors) are the most commonly used technology 
for collecting traffic data and agencies often have permanent detection locations 
reporting data.  Temporary tubes are sometimes used for specific purposes, but in 
general, agencies rely on loop detection for their traffic data.  To this extent, Tom 
Schinkel of the VDOT Mobility Management Division was able to provide study data 





detection locations are split directionally, they encompass three general locations.  
The following table provides general detector location details and these locations are 
also shown graphically in Figure 3-3. 
Table 3-2: I-495 Detector Location Information 
Detector ID Direction Start Location End Location 
90202 North Eisenhower Ave Connector SR 241/Telegraph Rd 
190004 South Eisenhower Ave Connector SR 241/Telegraph Rd 
90138 North I-95/I-395 29-620/Braddock Rd 
190057 South I-95/I-395 29-620/Braddock Rd 
90275 North Dulles Access Rd; SR 267/Dulles Toll Rd SR 193/Georgetown Pike 
190064 South Dulles Access Rd; SR 267/Dulles Toll Rd SR 193/Georgetown Pike 
 
It should be noted that the detectors are physically located between the given 
landmarks, which are easier to decipher while looking at a map than the actual 
latitude and longitude coordinates. 
 
Figure 3-3: I-495 Data Locations 





For this study, it is assumed that the available VDOT detector data is 
representative of the entire Virginia portion of I-495.  The data was collected on a 
per-lane basis and in 15 minute intervals, and was provided in aggregate form with all 
lanes combined by direction and data based hourly. 
Unfortunately, MD SHA was unable to provide data for this study, as no 
functioning permanent detection stations that collected all of the required information 
were available.  This was based on the fact that this data was not available from any 
of the five automatic traffic recorder (ATR) stations located on the Maryland section 
of I-495.  As such, the data provided by VDOT was used as representative for all of 
the Capital Beltway. 
The hourly speed and volume data, ranging from as far back as 2002, were 
cleansed and laid out in spreadsheet form by detector ID and year in order to provide 
consistency for analysis purposes.  Due to the fact that detection equipment 
sometimes reports false data (i.e. zero volumes, exorbitant speeds, etc.), “cleansing” 
of such data is required.  This process, in its most basic form, consisted of the 
following: 
• Separate and organize data from all detectors into individual years 
• Determine the day of week that each data point was collected and delete 
all weekend data 
• Delete any speed and volume outlier data (significant errors in data 
collection) 





• Spreadsheets were setup to contain Detector ID, Hour Code, Volume By 
Vehicle Classifications (split from 1-13), and Average Speed For All 
Vehicles on each row 
As expected with any research, data limitations exist in this study.  Since there 
was no Maryland data available for use, Virginia data is assumed representative 
across the entire Capital Beltway.  Although this may not be an entirely valid 
assumption, it can be used for information purposes and to calculate pricing for the 
Virginia portion of I-495.  Also of note, some of the detectors, whether it is based on 
their location or specific direction, don’t provide particularly exciting data at all 
times.  Whether that means certain detectors show consistent speeds throughout the 
day or only one pronounced peak period, all data is considered meaningful.  Not all 
locations on I-495 experience severe AM and PM peak period congestion and this 
data tends to make the model more representative instead of over-inflating it to the 
side of congestion.  If only data from congested locations were used, it would be 
inferred that traffic is uniform along the entire Capital Beltway, which is not the case. 
3.3.2 Speed Analysis 
The provided speed data were broken down by each vehicle classification.  
Using weighted averages based on the number of vehicles in each associated 
category, average hourly speeds for the entire traffic stream were calculated.  For 
each of the 24 hours in a day, average speed tables were created for each detector.  
With data existing from previous years, the hourly speeds were overlaid to view 
yearly changes.  An example of these hourly speed plots is shown as Figure 3-4 and 





Based on this plot, two peak periods are evident – one in the morning and one in the 
evening.  The apparent extent of the evening peak spreads across more hours than the 
morning peak.  For this thesis, peak periods are visually defined based on the hourly 
speed plots from the detectors.  From Figure 3-4, these peaks are estimated to occur 
from 6AM-10AM and 2PM-7PM.  
Speed data can also provide insight from another perspective.  By plotting 
average hourly speed by year, periods of decreased speed become easily visible. An 
example of these hourly speed plots is shown as Figure 3-5 and the additional plots 
from the remaining detectors can be viewed in the Appendix.  Based on this plot, 
decreases in speed are evident from 8AM-10AM and from 3PM-7PM.  Coupled with 
the previous plot, this information paints a clear picture of peak periods at each 
detector location. 
For the purpose of this thesis, free-flow speed is said to equal the uncongested 
traffic speed – as determined by the average of the 85th percentile speeds for each 
detector between 1AM and 4AM for all of 2007.  Free-flow speed is therefore found 
to equal 63.8 miles per hour (mph) on the Capital Beltway, even though the posted 
































Figure 3-4: Average Hourly Speed – Detector 190064 
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3.3.3 Flow Analysis 
In a similar fashion to the speed analysis, flow analysis was conducted on the 
data.  The provided volume data were broken down by each vehicle classification and 
multiplied by corresponding PCE factors to represent hourly PCE flow.  For each of 
the 24 hours in a day, average flow tables were created for each detector.  With data 
existing from previous years, the hourly flows were overlaid to view yearly changes.  
An example of these hourly speed plots is shown as Figure 3-6 and the additional 
plots from the remaining detectors can be viewed in the Appendix.  As with the 
hourly speed plot presented in the previous section, two peak periods are seen – one 
in the morning and one in the evening.  The apparent extent of the evening peak once 
again spreads across more hours than the morning peak – in this case, about two extra 
hours. 
Across multiple years, changes in flow are evident.  This is expected, as traffic 
volumes generally increase every year.  In addition to higher flow rates, expanded 
peak periods start to occur, as traffic shifts to the hours before and after the peak 
periods of previous years.  The flow data can also be visualized by plotting average 
hourly flow by year, making periods of increased flow more visible. An example of 
these hourly flow plots is shown as Figure 3-7 and the additional plots from the 
remaining detectors can be viewed in the Appendix.  Based on this plot, the greatest 
flow occurs between the hours of 6AM-11AM and from 12PM-8PM – these are not 
necessarily the true peak periods at this location.  These are just the times of day 





and the speed plots from the previous section, this information provides insight to 
peak periods at each detector location. 
From the speed analysis, it was determined that the average uncongested 
(free-flow) speed on I-495 was 63.8 mph.  Using the 2000 edition of the Highway 
Capacity Manual and this given free-flow speed, the per-lane capacity of I-495 is 
determined to be 2,350 passenger cars per lane per hour (pc/ln/hr).  For the purposes 
of this thesis, data will be examined on a per-lane basis instead of in terms of the total 
facility (i.e. four lanes).  By limiting the study to a per-lane basis, uniform traffic 
activity across each lane is assumed, even though this is probably not the case on I-
495. 
Volume-to-capacity (v/c) ratio is a common statistic used by traffic engineers 
to gauge the health or level of service of a certain roadway.  Using the flow data and 
the capacity figure from the Highway Capacity Manual, the hourly v/c ratio can be 
plotted for each detector, with data from previous years included, as well.  Volume-
to-capacity ratio plots are another tool used to view peak period conditions on the 
roadway.    An example of a v/c ratio plot is shown below, with the additional plots 
from the remaining detectors available in the Appendix.  Based on this plot, the AM 
and PM peaks are once again evident – the plot mimics the previous average hourly 


































Figure 3-6: Average Hourly Flow – Detector 190064 
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Figure 3-8: Hourly Volume-to-Capacity Ratio – Detector 190064 
3.3.4 Speed-Flow Relationship 
As the speed and flow data have been looked at separately up to this point, 
they are now combined in order to develop the relationship that is the backbone of 
this study.  Traffic speed and traffic flow data is plotted to see the effect that flow has 
on speed – hypothetically, speed decreases as flow increases.  While attempting to 
approximate the data with a straightforward linear relationship would be easy, it is far 





The Highway Capacity Manual provides equations that determine speeds 
based on a given free-flow speed (FFS) and available flow data (flow rate vp).  As the 
free-flow speed was calculated to be 63.8 mph for I-495, the following equations, as 
set forth in Exhibit 23-3 of the Highway Capacity Manual, will be utilized: 
For 55 ≤ FFS ≤ 70 and for flow rate (vp) 
  (3400 – 30FFS) < vp ≤ (1700 + 10FFS), 








 + − 
= − −  
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 Eq. 1 
For 55 ≤ FFS ≤ 75 and vp ≤ (3400 – 30FFS), 
  S FFS=        Eq. 2 
 The HCM equations are broken down into two sections, due to the fact that at 
low volumes, speed remains fairly constant and then starts to decrease at higher flow 
rates.  As such, the current HCM speed-flow relationship is shown as an unchanging 
constant portion at low flows and a slowly downward-curving portion at higher flows.  
Based on the above equations, the ranges are 1,486 pc/ln/hr to 2,338 pc/ln/hr for the 
first equation and less than 1,486 pc/ln/hr for the second.  By entering flow values 
from I-495 data and obtaining the corresponding speed values, a speed-flow plot can 
be created to show the effect that flow has on speed. 
By plotting the HCM equations over the I-495 data points, along with the 
fourth-order polynomial regression equation calculated from the data, the speed-flow 
relationship is visualized.  Within the regression equation, the constant is equal to the 
free-flow (uncongested) speed that was determined earlier.  The lane capacity of I-
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Figure 3-9: I-495 Speed vs. Flow 
While the HCM calculations may look approximately appropriate to the data, 
the regression equation from the I-495 data decreases at a greater rate.  The HCM 
calculations are based on national averages and I-495 data could vary for a number of 
reasons (year built, geometry, etc.).  It goes without saying that the general HCM 
calculations do not represent I-495 in this case, but would be quite helpful for 
situations where actual data for calculations is not available.  As discussed in chapter 
2, the HCM does not address hypercongestion – the area of unstable flow that occurs 
as flow reaches capacity and the curve turns inward on itself.  This area is the not 
within the scope of this thesis and will not be discussed.  While this may seem to be a 
limitation, congestion pricing can improve traffic flow to the point where this 





3.3.5 Delay Calculations 
Based on the speed-flow relationship equation derived from the data, the 
amount of delay imposed on the traffic stream by an additional PCE/lane/hour (in 
minutes per mile) can be calculated.  These calculations can be compared to those 
generated using the equations from the HCM in order to showcase differences and re-
validate the knowledge that the HCM equations are not appropriate as a 
generalization in the case where actual data is present to examine.  The delay 
calculation process is as follows: 
• For possible traffic flows, calculate the corresponding travel speed 
• Calculate time to travel one mile at given flow (based on speed) 
• Calculate time to travel one mile at one less PCE/lane/hour (based on 
speed) 
• Multiply the total flow by the difference in the previous two calculations 













mile at given 
volume 
(min./mile) 
Time to travel one 
mile at one less 
PCE/lane/hour 
(min./mile) 
Delay imposed on traffic 
stream by an additional 
PCE/lane/hour (min./mile) 
50 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
100 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
150 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
200 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
250 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
300 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
350 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
400 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
450 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
500 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
550 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
600 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
650 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
700 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
750 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
800 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
850 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
900 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
950 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
1000 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
1050 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
1100 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
1150 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
1200 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
1250 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
1300 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
1350 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
1400 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
1450 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00000 
1500 63.80 0.94044 0.94044 0.00105 
1550 63.79 0.94065 0.94064 0.01297 
1600 63.74 0.94137 0.94135 0.03395 
1650 63.64 0.94285 0.94281 0.06298 
1700 63.47 0.94527 0.94521 0.09995 
1750 63.24 0.94881 0.94873 0.14515 
1800 62.92 0.95365 0.95354 0.19915 
1850 62.50 0.95997 0.95983 0.26280 
1900 61.99 0.96796 0.96778 0.33724 
1950 61.36 0.97783 0.97761 0.42397 
2000 60.62 0.98983 0.98956 0.52492 
2050 59.75 1.00422 1.00391 0.64254 
2100 58.75 1.02134 1.02097 0.78001 
2150 57.61 1.04157 1.04113 0.94139 
2200 56.32 1.06537 1.06485 1.13198 
2250 54.88 1.09331 1.09271 1.35869 
2300 53.28 1.12612 1.12541 1.63075 
2338 51.96 1.15483 1.15403 1.87530 














mile at given 
volume 
(min./mile) 
Time to travel one 
mile at one less 
PCE/lane/hour 
(min./mile) 
Delay imposed on traffic 
stream by an additional 
PCE/lane/hour (min./mile) 
50 63.89 0.93914 0.93914 0.00000 
100 63.95 0.93829 0.93829 0.00000 
150 63.98 0.93784 0.93784 0.00000 
200 63.98 0.93772 0.93772 0.00012 
250 63.97 0.93789 0.93788 0.00145 
300 63.95 0.93829 0.93828 0.00305 
350 63.90 0.93890 0.93888 0.00481 
400 63.85 0.93966 0.93964 0.00665 
450 63.79 0.94055 0.94053 0.00851 
500 63.73 0.94155 0.94153 0.01033 
550 63.65 0.94261 0.94259 0.01210 
600 63.58 0.94374 0.94372 0.01378 
650 63.50 0.94491 0.94488 0.01539 
700 63.42 0.94611 0.94608 0.01696 
750 63.34 0.94733 0.94730 0.01851 
800 63.25 0.94857 0.94855 0.02010 
850 63.17 0.94984 0.94982 0.02183 
900 63.08 0.95115 0.95112 0.02377 
950 62.99 0.95249 0.95246 0.02605 
1000 62.90 0.95390 0.95387 0.02880 
1050 62.80 0.95538 0.95535 0.03218 
1100 62.70 0.95697 0.95694 0.03637 
1150 62.58 0.95870 0.95866 0.04157 
1200 62.46 0.96060 0.96056 0.04801 
1250 62.32 0.96272 0.96267 0.05593 
1300 62.17 0.96510 0.96505 0.06563 
1350 62.00 0.96779 0.96774 0.07741 
1400 61.80 0.97086 0.97080 0.09163 
1450 61.58 0.97437 0.97430 0.10870 
1500 61.33 0.97839 0.97831 0.12905 
1550 61.04 0.98301 0.98292 0.15321 
1600 60.71 0.98832 0.98821 0.18177 
1650 60.34 0.99443 0.99430 0.21541 
1700 59.91 1.00144 1.00129 0.25493 
1750 59.44 1.00949 1.00932 0.30127 
1800 58.90 1.01873 1.01853 0.35556 
1850 58.29 1.02933 1.02911 0.41915 
1900 57.61 1.04149 1.04123 0.49367 
1950 56.85 1.05543 1.05513 0.58113 
2000 56.00 1.07143 1.07109 0.68400 
2050 55.06 1.08979 1.08940 0.80541 
2100 54.01 1.11091 1.11046 0.94928 
2150 52.85 1.13523 1.13471 1.12066 
2200 51.58 1.16331 1.16271 1.32610 
2250 50.17 1.19585 1.19515 1.57426 
2300 48.63 1.23371 1.23289 1.87670 
2338 47.37 1.26671 1.26579 2.15236 





3.3.6 Speed Frequency and Probability by Flow Range 
The frequency of data points that fall in a certain flow range, along with the 
speed probabilities within a certain flow range, are interesting aspects to explore.  
Data existing under flow conditions less than 1,200 pc/ln/hr can be grouped together, 
as these low-flow areas are less interesting than periods of higher flow. 
Using all of the data points, along with three speed ranges (41-50 mph, 51-60 
mph, and 61-70 mph), the probability of a data point falling in each speed range can 
be calculated for increasing flow rates.  This will show the probability of being in 
each speed range as a function of flow.  This information is displayed in Figure 4-8 
and provides a sample probability density function (PDF) for each flow range.  The 
speed probability graph is not terribly surprising, as the probability of higher speeds 
decreases as flow increases.  A few strange overlap areas exist, and the 1,901-2,000 
pc/ln/hr flow range is particularly interesting since it is a merge point where all three 
speed ranges have an equal probability of occurring.  Curiosity arises when that sort 
of uncertainty exists. 
Moving forward, the frequency of data in each flow range is plotted as Figure 
4-9 – the relative frequency of the various flow ranges assists with critiquing the data.  
When looking at the frequency of data points across different flow ranges, the vast 
majority of data is from periods of lower demand that exhibit low-flow conditions 
(i.e. off-peak hours).  Although regular users of the Capital Beltway may choose to 
disagree, this observation makes sense, as there are more uncongested hours than 
congested hours in the day.  Flows greater than 1,200 pc/ln/hr, are characterized by a 





either end of the range.  Whenever these situations occur, the onset of some 
congestion in these locations may be the result.  The frequency of data greater than 
2,000 pc/ln/hr is low – possibly due to the fact that traffic is unable to exhibit the 
steady flow conditions that enable flows at this rate or higher. 






















































Figure 3-11: Frequency by Flow Range 
3.3.7 Traffic Proportions 
Traffic proportions for each of the 13 FHWA vehicle classifications are 
components of the optimization model and will be applied across varying flow levels.  
As traffic stream characteristics differ between AM and PM peak periods, analysis is 
completed using both periods in order to determine appropriate traffic proportion 
percentages.  As part of the Federal Highway Administration’s Highway Performance 
Monitoring System (HPMS), Maryland collects vehicle classification information on 
I-495.  For this reason, data from Maryland is able to be included at this stage of the 
study.  Although this data does not contain speed information and, therefore, cannot 
be used throughout the remainder of this study, traffic proportion percentages can be 






Based on general knowledge and the aforementioned flow and speed graphs 
that showcased evident peak period times, the AM peak period is defined as 6AM-
10AM and the PM peak period is defined as 3PM-7PM.  After combining all relevant 
data for these time periods and averaging Virginia and Maryland data together, the 
following percentages were obtained for each of the 13 FHWA vehicle 
classifications: 
Table 3-5: Peak Period Traffic Proportions 
 AM Peak (%) PM Peak (%) 
Class 1 0.16 0.16 
Class 2 83.18 86.78 
Class 3 12.39 10.35 
Class 4 0.68 0.42 
Class 5 0.90 0.60 
Class 6 0.58 0.24 
Class 7 0.24 0.07 
Class 8 0.22 0.16 
Class 9 1.55 1.17 
Class 10 0.06 0.02 
Class 11 0.03 0.02 
Class 12 0.01 0.01 
Class 13 0.00 0.00 
 
Although the AM and PM peak period traffic proportion percentages seem rather 
similar, they will be used separately when calculating the associated peak period 
charges. 
3.4 Value of Time Estimation 
In order to devise a pricing strategy, dollar amounts must be attributed to the 
time spent in congestion (i.e. the delay calculations set forth previously).  In order to 
do this, user value of time estimates must first be obtained.  As no studies have been 
undertaken in the Washington, D.C. area to associate value of time estimates to each 
of the 13 FHWA vehicle classifications, estimates are extrapolated from the Highway 





improvement selection decisions based on the relative benefit-cost merits of 
alternative improvement options (FHWA 2002).  The HERS model provides 
combined user value of time and vehicle operating costs for seven vehicle classes 
which differ from the 13 vehicle classifications used in this study.  As the amounts 
provided in the model’s documentation are not current, they are converted to 
equivalent 2007 dollars.  Prevailing wage data is the general basis for user value of 
time and costs are compensated by the fact that operating costs differ from vehicle-to-
vehicle.  These values include both aspects. 
Table 3-6: FHWA HERS Model – Value of Time 
Vehicle Class Value (in 2007 $/hour) 
Small Auto 21.37 
Med. Auto 21.43 
4-Tire Truck 24.27 
6-Tire Truck 27.18 
3-4 Axle Truck 32.19 
4-Axle Combo. 34.68 
5-Axle Combo. 34.34 
 
Based on the HERS model estimates and general assumptions about vehicle 
classifications, value of time and operating costs estimates are calculated for each of 
the 13 FHWA vehicle classifications.  Table 4-6 showcases these estimates.  It should 
be noted that operating costs for motorcycles are estimated to be half of those 
associated with passenger cars and user value of time is chosen to be represented by 
the $11.56 per hour value provided for personal, not business, travel.  Additionally, 
since no actual occupancy data were available, standard bus occupancy is assumed to 
be 30 passengers, all traveling under personal user value of time estimates.  While 






Table 3-7: FHWA Vehicle Classifications – Value of Time 















 In this study, the distribution of trip purposes is not taken into account.  Value 
of time is inherently laden with a trip purpose (i.e. personal use, business use, etc.) 
and, for this thesis, the assumption is made that value of time estimates are not 
reflecting varying trip purposes. 
3.5 Model Formulation 
As previously stated, one of the research objectives of this thesis is to develop 
a model that optimizes the pricing necessary to cause vehicle users on the Capital 
Beltway to realize the congestion costs that their vehicles impose on the rest of the 
traffic stream.  To this extent, congestion pricing will serve as a demand management 
tool.  While the model process will be outlined in this section, a visual demonstration 
will be provided in the next chapter. 






1. Using a provided initial flow condition and traffic proportions calculated 
previously, calculate the initial number of vehicles in each classification 
category 
2. Using the aforementioned equation that relates speed and flow and the given 
flow condition, calculate the initial speed of the traffic system 
3. Initial cost (per vehicle) to travel one mile can be calculated by dividing the 
total costs for each vehicle classification by the initial speed 
4. A variable congestion charge is introduced at this point and the cost for each 
vehicle to travel one mile, including the congestion charge, is calculated - this 
charge will be varied by the model 
5. The percent change in cost after adding the congestion charge is calculated 
6. Based on the assumed negative elasticity, the initial number of vehicles, and 
the percent change in cost, the change in flow after imposing the congestion 
charge is calculated 
7. The new flow for each vehicle classification is calculated by subtracting the 
change in flow from the initial flow 
8. Using the updated total flow in the traffic system, new traffic composition 
proportions and speed values can be calculated 
9. Calculate the average vehicle speed at one less PCE/lane/hour than the 
updated flow condition 
10. Calculate costs per vehicle at both the current speed and the speed at one less 





stream by one extra PCE (this concept is similar to the delay calculation that 
was explained previously) 
11. The total cost due to one extra PCE is the cost imposed on the entire traffic 
stream by the additional PCE added to the average cost per vehicle under 
current conditions 
12. A variable percent change is introduced at this point - this is used to calculate 
theoretical flow and cost information which is used by the optimization model 
13. Using the initial cost per vehicle to travel one mile under initial flow 
conditions, calculate a weighted cost average based on the new traffic 
proportions 
14. The resulting theoretical flow is found by multiplying the initial flow by one 
minus the percent change times the elasticity 
15. The resulting theoretical cost (i.e. the equilibrium demand price) is found by 
adding the weighted cost average based on the new traffic proportions to one 
plus the percent change 
16. At this point, the model is instructed to force the resulting theoretical cost 
minus the total cost due to one extra PCE to equal zero and to minimize the 
resulting theoretical flow minus the flow after the imposing the congestion 
charge 
17. The model runs until an optimal congestion charge solution is reached – this 
charge is the amount that equals the congestion cost under the conditions 






Throughout the model formulation process of this study, various assumptions 
needed to be made: 
• Due to the fact that no comprehensive Maryland data was available for I-
495, the obtained data from Virginia was assumed to be representative of 
the entire Capital Beltway.  As there are varying levels of traffic collected 
at each of the Virginia detector locations, this assumption seems valid.  
While the results of this Washington, D.C.-area study may not be entirely 
transferable to other regions, the methodology will remain valid. 
• When calculating AM and PM peak traffic proportions, it was assumed 
that the distribution of vehicle types across all travel lanes remained at the 
average values throughout the peaks (instead of changing hourly, etc.).  
While some changes might have occurred if the traffic proportions were 
analyzed on a per-hour basis, the changes would seemingly be small 
enough to merit using overall average values instead. 
• As no user value of time or vehicle operating cost data existed that was 
broken down into the 13 FHWA vehicle classifications, the estimated 
values used in the FHWA HERS model were assumed in this study.  
These values were not entirely specific for each vehicle classification, but 
are assumed valid due to the lack of more exhaustive data.  As stated 
previously, the distribution of trip purposes was not taken into account for 
the value of time estimation.  The assumption is made that value of time 





• In calculating total vehicle costs, no clear estimates were found on average 
bus occupancy on the Capital Beltway.  An average occupancy of 30 
passengers was assumed, due to the lack of sufficient ridership data.  As 
this value may seem high, it provides an approximation, although the total 
value of bus traffic may potentially be inflated. 
• Speed and flow distributions are assumed uniformly equal across all lanes 
of I-495 in this study.  In actuality, this is not the case.  Since the user 
charges are calculated at the PCE level, however, this does not seem to 
affect the results.  Regardless of the per-lane statistics, user charges are 
assigned to each PCE. 
• User value of time estimates may actually be different than calculated.  
User responses to congestion charges vary and people will express varying 
elasticity levels.  This being said, the value of time estimates set forth in 
this study should be taken as approximations. 
Due to the various assumptions set forth in this study, it is likely that the 
results of this study may be artificially low.  In this light, the results can be considered 
to be conservative estimations. 
The following chapter discusses the system evaluation, along with a 
demonstration of the model utilized in this study.  Applicable user charges and 





Chapter 4: System Evaluation 
4.1 Inputs 
The input parameters for this model have been previously touched on, at least 
briefly, as they were obtained or calculated from available I-495 data.  To summarize: 
• Flow – measured in passenger cars per lane per hour (pc/ln/hr); obtained 
from I-495 data 
• Speed-flow relationship – regression equation calculated from I-495 data 
obtained for this study in order to show the impact of traffic flow on traffic 
speed; this equation can be used to estimate speeds under various flow 
conditions 
• Total vehicle costs – measured in dollars per hour ($/hr); calculated by 
summing user value of time and vehicle operating costs for each of the 13 
FHWA vehicle classifications 
• Traffic proportions – measured as a percentage (%); traffic proportions for 
each of the 13 FHWA vehicle classifications were calculated in the AM 
and PM peak periods based on the total traffic volume data obtained from 
I-495 
• Elasticity – unitless number; a negative elasticity indicates the changes 
that occur in road use as a result of increased costs; the assumed elasticity 
of -0.2 for this model is based on a general literature search, estimates 
from the existing charging system in Stockholm, Sweden, and the 





must be estimated, as the true value cannot be determined unless pricing is 
actually implemented and travel behavior is observed 
While all of these parameters are vital for a functional model, they are not all direct 
inputs from the user.  The speed-flow regression equation and all applicable constants 
are programmed into the model.  All other inputs are controlled by the user.   
4.2 Outputs 
The outputs produced by this model can be placed into two categories: process 
outputs and final outputs.  Process outputs consist of calculations that occur 
throughout the iterative process of the model that lead to the final outputs – the 
optimized variables. 
Process outputs: 
• Initial number of vehicles – measured in passenger car equivalents (PCEs); 
calculated based on initial flow and traffic proportion conditions 
• Initial speed – measured in miles per hour (mph); calculated from the 
speed-flow regression equation using initial flow conditions 
• Initial cost (per vehicle) to travel one mile – measured in $/mile; 
calculated based on total vehicle costs and initial speed 
• Cost to travel one mile (with congestion charge) – measured in $/mile; 
calculated using the initial cost (per vehicle) to travel one mile and the 
varying congestion charge 
• Percent change in cost (after congestion charge) – measured as a 
percentage; calculated based on the initial cost (per vehicle) to travel one 





• Change in flow (after congestion charge) – measured in pc/ln/hr; 
calculated using the initial number of vehicles, the assumed elasticity and 
the percent change in cost (after congestion charge) 
• Percent change in flow (after congestion charge) – measured as a 
percentage; calculated using the initial number of vehicles and the change 
in flow (after congestion charge) 
• New flow (after congestion charge) – measured in pc/ln/hr; calculated 
from the initial flow and the change in flow (after congestion charge) 
• New proportion of traffic (after congestion charge) – measured as a 
percentage; calculated using the new flow (after congestion charge) for 
each vehicle classification and the total new flow (after congestion charge) 
• New speed (after congestion charge) – measured in mph; calculated from 
the speed-flow regression equation using new flow conditions (after 
congestion charge) 
• Vehicle speed at one PCE/lane/hour less (after congestion charge) – 
measured in mph; calculated from the speed-flow regression equation 
using one PCE less than new flow conditions (after congestion charge) 
• Average cost per vehicle (after congestion charge) – measured in $/mile; 
calculated based on the new speed (after congestion charge) and the total 
vehicle costs 
• Average cost per vehicle at one PCE/lane/hour less (after congestion 
charge) – measured in $/mile; calculated based on the vehicle speed at one 





• Cost imposed on the entire traffic stream by one extra PCE – measured in 
$/mile; calculated using the average cost per vehicle (after congestion 
charge), average cost per vehicle at one PCE/lane/hour less (after 
congestion charge), and new flow (after congestion charge); this 
calculation is similar to the delay calculation process explained previously 
• Total cost due to one extra PCE – measured in $/mile; calculated using the 
weighted average cost per vehicle at one PCE/lane/hour less (after 
congestion charge) and the cost imposed on the entire traffic stream by 
one extra PCE 
• Resulting theoretical flow (i.e. equilibrium demand flow) – measured in 
PCE/ln/hr; calculated using the initial flow conditions, assumed elasticity, 
and varying percent change 
• Resulting theoretical cost (i.e. equilibrium demand price) – measured in 
$/PCE/mile; calculated using the weighted cost (per vehicle) to travel one 
mile under initial flow conditions and varying percent change 
Final outputs: 
• Optimized congestion pricing – measured in $/PCE/mile; obtained from 
the optimization model; the objective function is setup as follows: 
Minimize: equilibrium demand flow - calculated flow with the congestion 
charge 
Subject to the constraint: equilibrium demand price = calculated total 
cost due to one extra PCE 





• Percent change – measured as a percentage; obtained from the 
optimization model, where it is used to equate the equilibrium demand 
price and equilibrium demand flow; this percentage corresponds to the 
marginal cost of the system – the difference between the weighted cost 
(per vehicle) to travel one mile under initial flow conditions and the 
equilibrium demand price 
4.3 Model Demonstration 
In order to summarize accomplishments, this model utilizes the Solver tool in 
Excel to find the congestion charge which equates the total cost due to one extra PCE 
and the equilibrium demand price.  The total cost due to one extra PCE varies with 
the congestion charge and the consequent changes in traffic volumes and speeds, 
taking into account changes in traffic composition by vehicle classification.  The 
equilibrium demand price varies in accordance with the assumed elasticity, with the 
change in traffic conditions from the initial to the final condition determined by the 
Excel model (Roth 2001).  The objective function of this model forces the calculated 
total cost due to one extra PCE to equal the equilibrium demand price; as a result, 
users will pay the marginal cost of the system.  This results in a system-optimized 
network, where costs imposed by drivers are realized. 
Figure 4-1 shows the model spreadsheet layout for an assumed elasticity of -
0.2 and an initial flow condition of 2,000 PCE/lane/hour.  From the model’s 
standpoint, a positive elasticity input of 0.2 actually corresponds to -0.2.  From 
Chapter 3, the initial proportion of traffic (based on the AM peak calculations) and 





congestion price ($0.14 per PCE per mile) and new anticipated flow (1,856 
PCE/lane/hour).  The yellow highlights denote variable inputs from the user and the 
green highlights indicate variables utilized by the Solver tool in Excel.
 
 58 
FHWA Vehicle Classes Description Units 
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Class 6 Class 7 Class 8 Class 9 Class 10 Class 11 Class 12 Class 13 
Total 
speed = (a * flow^4) + (b * flow^3) – 
(c * flow^2) + (d * flow) + 63.8                               
a = -0.000000000002                
b = 0.000000006                
c = 0.000007                
d = 0.0021                
average uncongested speed = 63.8 mph                
user value of time + vehicle operating costs                 
  $/hour 12.31 21.4 24.27 346.93 27.18 32.19 32.19 34.68 34.34 34.34 34.34 34.34 34.34   
Initial flow PCE/lane/hour                           2000 
Initial proportion of traffic percentage 0.159% 83.177% 12.385% 0.683% 0.898% 0.582% 0.245% 0.224% 1.551% 0.058% 0.030% 0.006% 0.002% 100% 
Initial number of vehicles PCEs 3 1664 248 14 18 12 5 4 31 1 1 0 0 2000 
Initial speed mph 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00   
Initial cost (per vehicle) to travel 1 mile $/mile 0.21982 0.38214 0.43339 6.19518 0.48536 0.57482 0.57482 0.61929 0.61321 0.61321 0.61321 0.61321 0.61321   
Congestion charge $/PCE/mile                           0.14 
Cost to travel 1 mile (with congestion charge) $/mile 0.36212 0.52445 0.57570 6.33748 0.62766 0.71712 0.71712 0.76159 0.75552 0.75552 0.75552 0.75552 0.75552   
Elasticity  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2   
Percent change in cost (after congestion 
charge) percentage 64.74% 37.24% 32.83% 2.30% 29.32% 24.76% 24.76% 22.98% 23.21% 23.21% 23.21% 23.21% 23.21%   
Percent change in flow (after congestion 
charge) percentage 12.95% 7.45% 6.57% 0.46% 5.86% 4.95% 4.95% 4.60% 4.64% 4.64% 4.64% 4.64% 4.64%   
Change in flow (after congestion charge) PCE/lane/hour 0 124 16 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0   
New flow (after congestion charge) PCE/lane/hour 3 1540 231 14 17 11 5 4 30 1 1 0 0 1856 
New proportion of traffic (after congestion 
charge) percentage 0.149% 82.966% 12.471% 0.733% 0.911% 0.596% 0.251% 0.230% 1.594% 0.060% 0.031% 0.006% 0.002%   
New speed (after congestion charge) mph 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22   
Flow (with congestion charge) PCE/lane/hour                           1856 
Vehicle speed (with congestion charge) mph 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22 58.22   
Vehicle speed at one PCE/lane/hour less mph 58.23 58.23 58.23 58.23 58.23 58.23 58.23 58.23 58.23 58.23 58.23 58.23 58.23   
Average cost per vehicle (at new vehicle 
speed) $/mile 0.21145 0.36760 0.41690 5.95938 0.46688 0.55294 0.55294 0.59571 0.58987 0.58987 0.58987 0.58987 0.58987 0.42125 
Average cost per vehicle at one PCE/lane/hour 
less $/mile 0.21141 0.36752 0.41680 5.95805 0.46678 0.55282 0.55282 0.59558 0.58974 0.58974 0.58974 0.58974 0.58974 0.42115 
Cost imposed on the entire traffic stream by 
one extra PCE $/mile              0.17458 
Total cost due to one extra PCE $/mile                           0.59583 
Percent change percentage                           36.1 
Elasticity               0.2 
Initial flow PCE/lane/hour              2000 
Speed under initial flow conditions mph 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00   
Cost (per vehicle) to travel 1 mile under initial 
flow conditions $/PCE/mile 0.21982 0.38214 0.43339 6.19518 0.48536 0.57482 0.57482 0.61929 0.61321 0.61321 0.61321 0.61321 0.61321 0.43791 
Resulting theoretical flow (based on elasticity 
and % change) PCE/lane/hour              1856 
Resulting theoretical cost (based on elasticity 
and % change) $/PCE/mile                           0.59583 
(Resulting theoretical cost - Total cost due to 
one extra PCE) $/PCE/mile                           0.0 
(Resulting theoretical flow - Flow with 
congestion charge) PCE/lane/hour                           0.0 





As the observed traffic composition differs between AM and PM peaks on the 
Capital Beltway, the two periods are examined as separate entities.  Initial hourly 
volumes are calculated based on averages obtained from all detector data across that 
specific hour in 2007.  For both the AM and PM peak periods, the average hourly 
volumes are provided and optimal congestion charges for an assumed -0.2 elasticity 
are displayed for each of the 13 FHWA vehicle classifications on a per-hour basis.  
Additionally, the anticipated traffic composition as a result of congestion charging is 
offered. 
4.4.1 AM Peak 
Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 show the average hourly flow and applicable 
congestion charges, respectively, for the AM peak period on the Capital Beltway.  
Table 4-3 presents the anticipated hourly traffic composition as a result of congestion 
charging.  Most notably, it is seen that for the AM peak, the optimal congestion 
charge ranges from $0.05 to $0.08 per PCE per mile, based on average hourly flow 
conditions on I-495.  While these figures are applicable to passenger cars, the lowest 
possible charges (for class 1 vehicles) range from $0.02 to $0.03 per mile and the 
highest possible charges (for class 13 vehicles) range from $0.22 to $0.35 per mile.  
The range in charges is directly obtained from the corresponding PCE factors – 
vehicles are charged appropriately for the amount of road space that they utilize.  





Table 4-1: Average AM Peak Hourly Flow for I-495 
HOUR OF DAY AVERAGE PCE/LANE/HOUR (2007) 
6 (6AM) 1598 
7 (7AM) 1743 
8 (8AM) 1709 
9 (9AM) 1653 
 
Table 4-2: AM Peak Hourly Congestion Charges for I-495 




Factor 6AM 7AM 8AM 9AM 
1 Motorcycle 0.38 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 
2 Passenger Cars 1.00 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.06 
3 Other Two-Axle, Four-Tire single Unit Vehicles 1.13 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.07 
4 Buses 2.38 0.12 0.19 0.17 0.14 
5 Two-Axle, Six-Tire, Single-Unit Trucks 1.63 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.10 
6 Three-Axle Single-Unit Trucks 1.56 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.09 
7 Four or More Axle Single-Unit Trucks 2.00 0.10 0.16 0.14 0.12 
8 Four or Fewer Axle Single-Trailer Trucks 2.75 0.14 0.22 0.19 0.17 
9 Five-Axle Single-Trailer Trucks 4.00 0.20 0.32 0.28 0.24 
10 Six or More Axle Single-Trailer Trucks 3.94 0.20 0.32 0.28 0.24 
11 Five or Fewer Axle Multi-Trailer Trucks 4.25 0.21 0.34 0.30 0.26 
12 Six-Axle Multi-Trailer Trucks 4.56 0.23 0.37 0.32 0.27 
13 Seven or More Axle Multi-Trailer Trucks 4.31 0.22 0.35 0.30 0.26 
 
Table 4-3: AM Peak Traffic Composition Resulting from Congestion Pricing 
Traffic Composition (PCE/lane/hour) 
6AM 7AM 8AM 9AM 
Vehicle 
Classification 
Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final 
Total 1598 1550 1743 1668 1709 1641 1653 1596 
1 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 
2 1329 1288 1450 1385 1421 1363 1375 1326 
3 198 193 216 207 212 204 205 198 
4 11 11 12 12 12 12 11 11 
5 14 14 16 15 15 15 15 14 
6 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 9 
7 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
9 25 24 27 26 27 26 26 25 
10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
11 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4.4.2 PM Peak 
Table 4-4 and Table 4-5 show the average hourly flow and applicable 




Table 4-6 presents the anticipated hourly traffic composition as a result of congestion 
charging.  Most notably, it is seen that for the PM peak, the optimal congestion 
charge ranges from $0.03 to $0.08 per PCE per mile, based on average hourly flow 
conditions on I-495.  While these figures are applicable to passenger cars, the lowest 
possible charges (for class 1 vehicles) range from $0.01 to $0.03 per mile and the 
highest possible charges (for class 13 vehicles) range from $0.13 to $0.35 per mile.  
The range in charges is directly obtained from the corresponding PCE factors – 
vehicles are charged appropriately for the amount of road space that they utilize.  
Information on potential charging for roadway sections with greater flow will be 
discussed later. 
Table 4-4: Average PM Peak Hourly Flow for I-495 
HOUR OF DAY AVERAGE PCE/LANE/HOUR (2007) 
14 (2PM) 1733 
15 (3PM) 1674 
16 (4PM) 1583 
17 (5PM) 1514 
18 (6PM) 1439 
 
Table 4-5: PM Peak Hourly Congestion Charges for I-495 




Factor 2PM 3PM 4PM 5PM 6PM 
1 Motorcycle 0.38 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 
2 Passenger Cars 1.00 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 
3 Other Two-Axle, Four-Tire single Unit Vehicles 1.13 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.03 
4 Buses 2.38 0.19 0.17 0.12 0.10 0.07 
5 Two-Axle, Six-Tire, Single-Unit Trucks 1.63 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.05 
6 Three-Axle Single-Unit Trucks 1.56 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.05 
7 Four or More Axle Single-Unit Trucks 2.00 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.06 
8 Four or Fewer Axle Single-Trailer Trucks 2.75 0.22 0.19 0.14 0.11 0.08 
9 Five-Axle Single-Trailer Trucks 4.00 0.32 0.28 0.20 0.16 0.12 
10 Six or More Axle Single-Trailer Trucks 3.94 0.32 0.28 0.20 0.16 0.12 
11 Five or Fewer Axle Multi-Trailer Trucks 4.25 0.34 0.30 0.21 0.17 0.13 
12 Six-Axle Multi-Trailer Trucks 4.56 0.37 0.32 0.23 0.18 0.14 





Table 4-6: PM Peak Traffic Composition Resulting from Congestion Pricing 
Traffic Composition (PCE/lane/hour) 
2PM 3PM 4PM 5PM 6PM 
Vehicle 
Classification 
Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final 
Total 1733 1660 1674 1613 1583 1537 1514 1478 1439 1411 
1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 
2 1504 1439 1453 1398 1374 1333 1314 1282 1249 1224 
3 179 173 173 168 164 160 157 153 149 146 
4 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 
5 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 8 
6 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
8 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
9 20 20 20 19 19 18 18 17 17 17 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4.4.3 Discussion of Results 
As seen in the two previous sections, the optimal AM and PM peak period 
charges range from $0.03 to $0.08 per passenger car equivalent per mile.  These 
estimates are lower than the $0.08 to $0.50 per mile estimates, in 2007 dollars, taken 
from existing literature.  In terms of the city street methodology on which this study is 
based, Roth and Villoria (2001) found optimal pricing in the range of $0.29 to $0.64 
per passenger car equivalent per mile, in 2007 dollars.  Based on these other figures, 
it seems as if there could be other factors that this study did not take into account.  
Other estimations may very well have other factors included.  For this reason, these 
results should be taken as rough approximations. 
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
With any model, it is important to analyze changes in input parameters to 
determine the corresponding responses.  This section focuses on the effects of direct 




the congestion charges computed.  In a way, it is difficult to perform substantial 
sensitivity analysis with an optimization model that outputs a single “best” answer.  
There are relatively few parameters open for sensitivity analysis since the Solver tool 
optimizes the data and the key speed-flow relationship is, more or less, obvious.  
Initial flow is another direct input into the model, but is not available for sensitivity 
analysis.  It goes without saying that speed is a function of flow and that as flow 
increases, the optimal congestion charges will increase, as congestion costs are 
greater. 
4.5.1 Effect of Elasticity 
In the previous section, congestion charges were presented based on average 
flow conditions in the AM and PM peak periods.  This section will take a different 
route and present AM and PM peak congestion charge estimates for varying elasticity 
levels – flows ranging from 0 to 2,350 PCE/lane/hour (lane capacity) will be 
addressed.  Figures 4-2 and 4-3 show the sensitivity of AM and PM peak congestion 


















































Figure 4-2: Sensitivity of Elasticity Values for Congestion Charges (AM Peak) 


















































Especially interesting about this sensitivity analysis is that a large change in 
assumed elasticity does not cause similarly large changes in the congestion charge.  In 
fact, the optimal charges at lower flow levels (less than about 1,500 PCE/lane/hour) 
are very similar across all elasticity levels.  It is only at higher flow levels that the 
plots fan out from one another.  At capacity, the charge varies from $0.09 to $0.38 per 
PCE per mile for the AM peak and from $0.09 to $0.37 per PCE per mile for the PM 
peak.  Even though this is a spread increase of over four times, the total cost is still 
not significant enough to claim that assumed elasticity has a large impact on optimal 
congestion charges. 
From these plots, the effects of elasticity can be easily seen.  For an assumed 
elasticity value of -1.0, it can be assumed that other transportation (i.e. public transit) 
options are readily available.  For this reason, there is a larger decrease in road usage 
at a lower price.  As elasticity go towards -0.1, there is not as much of a decrease in 
road usage in the presence of pricing, so charges must be increased in order to cause a 
decrease in road usage. 
4.5.2 Effect of Traffic Proportions 
Traffic proportions have an effect on congestion charges due to the different 
total costs incurred per mile for each vehicle classification.  For example, in the case 
of the I-495 data used in this study, the vast majority of vehicles are passenger cars.  
The total cost, per mile, to operate a passenger car is much less than the total cost, per 
mile, to operate a seven or more axle multi-trailer truck.  For this reason, the weighted 
cost of the vehicles in the traffic stream will be lower when there is a greater 




To illustrate this, assume that the total flow is currently 2,000 PCE/lane/hour.  
For simplicity’s sake, there are only two types of vehicles on the roadway: passenger 
cars and seven or more axle multi-trailer trucks.  Using the same values of time and 
elasticity, the optimal congestion charge when the traffic consists of 75% passenger 
cars and 25% seven or more axle multi-trailer trucks is $0.15 per PCE per mile.  
When the traffic stream consists of 25% passenger cars and 75% seven or more axle 
multi-trailer trucks, the optimal congestion charge is $0.19 per PCE per mile.  For a 
large change in traffic proportion conditions, there is a relatively small change in the 
optimal congestion charge. 
4.5.3 Effect of Value of Time and Vehicle Operating Costs 
It is difficult to address the effect of value of time and vehicle operating costs 
due to the fact that traffic proportions interact significantly with these values to 
determine the optimal congestion charge.  When previously analyzing the effect of 
traffic proportions, it was assumed that total costs remained the same as they did 
throughout the study.  If the total costs for a certain vehicle are incredibly high and 
there are none using the roadway, the weighted average of congestion costs across the 
traffic stream will be much lower than if there are many of these vehicles on the 
roadway.  For this reason, the effect of total vehicle costs on optimal congestion 
charge is deemed to be worthy of mention, along with the fact that there is a strong 





This chapter has shown that optimal AM and PM peak period charges range 
from $0.03 to $0.08 per passenger car equivalent per mile in this study.  These 
estimates are lower than the $0.08 to $0.50 per mile estimates taken from existing 
literature.  Based on these figures, it seems as if there could be other factors that this 
study did not take into account.  Other estimations may very well have other factors 
included.  For this reason, these results should be taken as rough approximations.  
Additionally, lower values infer less congestion – in this case, the congestion pricing 
strategy should be examined to see that it is encompassing the hours of the day that 
truly merit such pricing, based on the context of this study. 
This thesis is limited by the fact that elasticity estimates are assumed 
equivalent across the entire traffic population and value of time estimates are assumed 
equal across similar vehicle types.  In actuality, this would not be the case, as not 
everyone is affected in the same way.  It is difficult, however, to take these factors 
into account and, thus, this study should be viewed under hypothetical pretenses. 
Based on the results set forth in this chapter, it is determined that vehicle users 
with a lower combined value of time and vehicle operating cost experience the most 
change with congestion pricing.  Fewer of these users utilize the roadway after 
congestion pricing is implemented – this shows that, among other things, these users 
either change their driving habits to occur in off-peak hours or they switch to other 
forms of transportation.  Commercial truck operations and commuters lacking 
flexible work schedules are significantly affected by congestion pricing.  These users 




Chapter 5: Implementation 
5.1 Overview 
While previous chapters have centered on such topics as calculations and data 
management, this chapter will focus on the logistics behind implementing a 
congestion pricing system for the Capital Beltway.  The optimization model 
developed in this study can be seen as a “first-best” congestion pricing strategy, as 
users realize their full congestion costs and roads are used most efficiently.  
Unfortunately, congestion charges that vary in real-time based on actual conditions 
are not practical at this point in time.  For the sake of feasibility in the Washington, 
D.C. area, a “second-best” congestion pricing solution must be examined, where 
charges varying on an hourly scale instead of smoothly time-varying charges.  When 
demonstrating the model in Chapter 4, this was the methodology considered.  Without 
a system like this, where the general public can be aware of the charges in advance in 
order to make an informed decision about their driving habits, acceptance will be 
lacking.  After a “second-best” system is implemented, more advances can be made 
towards a gradual “first-best” solution. 
It is important to note that under a congestion pricing scheme, charges should 
bear some relationship to congestion costs imposed and vary by time of day and by 
location.  Ideally, the congestion price they should equal the imposed costs (as 
calculated with the optimization model in this study).  Instead of paying a flat fee 
when passing a cordon, charges should be assessed as vehicles pass pricing points 




previously, this strategy falls somewhere in the middle of these requirements – hourly 
charges enacted on a per-mile basis. 
5.2 Congestion Pricing Strategy 
This congestion pricing strategy is largely based on a review of other 
implemented systems.  Obtained data from select locations of I-495 have been 
assumed representative across the entire Capital Beltway due to lack of other data.  It 
should be noted that a more effective approach would be to analyze smaller sections 
independently (i.e. split I-495 into a number of predefined zones) based on observed 
data in those sections.  The congestion charges, therefore, would vary by zone instead 
of being assumed representative of the entire roadway.  For example, areas exhibiting 
traffic flow conditions much greater than calculated averages would be assigned 
charges that are higher than those assigned to sections exhibiting lower traffic flow 
conditions. 
5.2.1 Hours of Operation 
The proposed hours of operation for this congestion charging system are 
6:00AM – 10:00AM and 2:00PM – 7:00PM.  These timeframes encompass the 
morning and evening peak periods on the Capital Beltway, as exhibited in Chapter 4.  
The hourly extent of the PM peak period is greater than the AM peak, as represented 
by the proposed hours of operation.  Future iterations of a congestion charging 
strategy could add an additional morning hour from 5:00AM – 6:00AM or implement 
24-hour charging on I-495.  This system will operate only on weekdays, excluding 





Table 5-1 shows the hourly congestion charges for this system, in dollars per 
PCE per mile.  Corresponding charges for each of the 13 FHWA vehicle 
classifications can be obtained by multiplying the charge by the PCE factors that were 
presented in Chapter 3. 




12:00AM - 12:59AM 
1:00AM - 1:59AM 
2:00AM - 2:59AM 
3:00AM - 3:59AM 
4:00AM - 4:59AM 
5:00AM - 5:59AM 
NO CHARGE 
6:00AM - 6:59AM 0.05 
7:00AM - 7:59AM 0.08 
8:00AM - 8:59AM 0.07 
9:00AM - 9:59AM 0.06 
10:00AM - 10:59AM 
11:00AM - 11:59AM 
12:00PM - 12:59PM 
1:00PM - 1:59PM 
NO CHARGE 
2:00PM - 2:59PM 0.08 
3:00PM - 3:59PM 0.07 
4:00PM - 4:59PM 0.05 
5:00PM - 5:59PM 0.04 
6:00PM - 6:59PM 0.03 
7:00PM - 7:59PM 
8:00PM - 8:59PM 
9:00PM - 9:59PM 
10:00PM - 10:59PM 
11:00PM - 11:59PM 
NO CHARGE 
 
These charges were calculated based on an assumed elasticity estimate of -0.2, 
which was discussed previously in Chapter 2 and is based on theoretical studies and 
implementation in Stockholm.  After implementation, the actual elasticity in regards 





The main goal of this congestion pricing strategy is drawn from the research 
objectives of this study.  As travelers fail to realize their role in congestion, these 
charges attempt to equal their contributed congestion costs to the traffic stream.  
Secondary goals are operating a system that pays for itself and does not require 
subsidies and improved traffic conditions, among others.  These are not focal points 
of the congestion pricing system, but are worth mentioning as potential positive 
outcomes. 
5.2.4 Conditions 
As evident with other pricing systems that are in-place, special conditions 
under the system must be addressed.  Pricing systems are typically bogged down with 
numerous exemptions and this proposed system attempts to stray away from that 
scenario. 
For this system, transit and emergency vehicles will be granted free access.  
While this is not specifically addressed in this study, the costs of these vehicles would 
be subsidized in some way.  Additionally, low-income motorists may be eligible for 
toll credits that could be used as assistance.  Prerequisites for these credits would 
need to be determined before implementation.  Hybrid vehicle owners will not 
receive any discounts, although more stringent charges for vehicles exerting higher 
levels of pollution could be considered. 
System shut-off conditions must also be in-place to accommodate unforeseen 
scenarios.  Examples of this have not been found in existing literature and could be 




circumstances, the system would be shifted into “no-charge” mode and operated 
accordingly until the roadway network regains normal operating conditions.  A full 
outline of potential system shut-off scenarios would be created before 
implementation. 
5.2.5 Payment Options 
Multiple payment options will exist for users of the Capital Beltway.  The 
most efficient method, by far, will be a direct withdrawal from a user account, which 
travelers stock with funds in advance via the Internet, mail, or telephone.  This 
method would be comparable to the E-ZPass toll system that exists in the northeast 
United States.  Other post-travel options will also include Internet, mail, and 
telephone-based payments. 
Charges accrued that are not tied to a user account will be required monthly, 
with users receiving a bill.  In this light, congestion charges could be likened to a 
monthly cable or telephone bill.  Although a monthly billing system would be in-
place, payments would be accepted at any point in time.  For example, a user could 
pay their total charge on a daily basis instead of waiting until the end of the month to 
pay all of the charges that have accumulated.  If timely payments are not made, the 
user could be assessed a penalty amounting to 20% of the total owed. 
5.2.6 Revenue Spending 
Revenue spending is a key concern for any congestion pricing system.  For the 
purposes of this system, revenue will be first utilized to cover start-up and ongoing 




excess revenue can be applied to supporting public transit and road improvements, 
with public transit being a priority.  By utilizing the revenue in this manner, the 
public will know that they are benefiting from the congestion charging in a tangible 
way. 
5.2.7 Technology 
Until recently, technology was not readily available to operate the proposed 
congestion pricing system.  As the cost of equipment has decreased, complex and 
efficient systems are now quite possible.  With the technological advances that have 
been made since the idea of congestion pricing originated, implementation of a 
pricing system is now easier than ever before.  The following two sections address the 
technology proposed for the I-495 congestion pricing system. 
5.2.7.1 Open Road Tolling 
Open road tolling refers to the process of collecting tolls on a roadway 
without the use of toll plazas, where drivers are charged appropriately without having 
to stop or slow down.  The major advantage to open road tolling is just that - users are 
not required to slow down and are able to maintain their highway travel speed.  Tolls 
are typically collected using radio frequency identification (RFID) systems – the E-
ZPass system utilized in the northeastern United States is an example of this.  Figure 






Figure 5-1: Open Road Tolling Gantry 
The slight disadvantage to open road tolling is the small possibility of equipment not 
correctly identifying vehicles.  More research is required in this area, but it is not 
expected to severely impact systems utilizing this technology. 
5.2.7.2 Enforcement/Collection 
The enforcement and collection of applicable congestion charges will be 
overseen by a system of electronic toll collectors and cameras running to video 
recognition software.  Open road tolling technology goes hand-in-hand with 
electronic toll collection (ETC).  ETC systems generally use transponders to 
automatically debit pre-paid accounts of registered cars without having them stop or 
slow down – this method is, by far, most efficient.  Electronic toll collection systems 
are based on four key components, all of which are automated.  These are: 
• Vehicle identification 
• Vehicle classification 
• Transaction processing 




As an added incentive for drivers to obtain transponders, 10,000 of them will 
be given away before implementation. 
In the circumstances where drivers do not have a registered transponder, 
enforcement cameras will photograph the vehicle's license plate.  Optical recognition 
software will be utilized to translate the images into text, which can then be searched 
for in the database maintained by the Department of Motor Vehicles.  An example of 
such software, as used in London, is shown in Figure 5-2.  Figure 5-3 shows a typical 
camera setup for the charging system implemented in Stockholm. 
 







Figure 5-3: Typical Gantry Camera Setup (Stockholm) 
(Source: Vägverket) 
5.2.8 Comparisons to Existing Systems 
Two of the most notable pricing schemes in existence are located in London 
and Stockholm.  This section aims to briefly compare key components of these 
systems to the proposed implementation. 
The main difference is that this study’s charging strategy is based per-mile.  In 
both Stockholm and London, charges are collected at cordons around the city and no 
charging is based on actual miles driven.  The essence of congestion pricing is based 
on location, time, and amount driven.  Out of the three, only the proposed Capital 
Beltway strategy takes all of these components into account. 
In terms of operating hours, both London and Stockholm operate from the 
beginning of the morning peak until the end of the evening peak, including the time 




traffic flows throughout the day are not yet great enough to merit charging as a means 
to relieve congestion.  As the system progresses, however, this is a natural expansion. 
Both London and Stockholm utilize cameras with license plate recognition 
systems in order to charge drivers.  The I-495 system will primarily use electronic toll 
collection through transponders, with cameras as a backup option for vehicles that are 
not equipped with the necessary transponder. 
Revenue spending is a key concern for any pricing strategy.  London spends 
most of the revenue gained from the system (after ongoing and operating costs are 
deducted) on improved bus services within the city.  Stockholm, on the other hand, 
uses all revenue solely for road construction.  It is generally regarded that public 
transportation and roadway improvements should be obtained from excess revenue, 
as the public can then see, first-hand, how the collected money is being spent.  For 
this reason, all revenue collected on I-495 after start-up and operating costs are 
obtained will be dedicated to these sources. 
As a final point, both the London and Stockholm systems are full of 
exemptions and discount options for various types of vehicles and residents.  The 
strategy proposed in this study aimed to avoid this scenario and have as few 
exemptions as possible. 
5.3 Equity Considerations 
A major concern of congestion pricing is that it is unfair to certain groups of 
people.  This argument stems from the belief that congestion pricing favors the rich, 
as the poor are unable to afford the charges.  This is actually not the case, as low-




brought about by collected revenue and the fact that public transit vehicles are 
sanctioned for use within congestion pricing areas, so greater reliability and decreased 
travel times could be expected.  A well-designed pricing plan can be less burdensome 
to low-income citizens than current systems that are based on regressive taxes, such 
as car registration fees, sales taxes and the gas tax (FHWA 2001).  Hypothetically, 
congestion pricing can easily be shown to increase social welfare by making travelers 
pay an amount closer to the full social costs resulting from their driving decisions 
(Harrington 1998). 
Most equity arguments are assuaged though proper revenue recycling, that is, 
by creating a focused public benefit instead of what appears to just be a tax.  The true 
equity impact of any roadway pricing scheme depends heavily on how the revenues 
are reused in the transportation system.  Equity concerns can be offset by filtering 
revenue into programs that benefit lower-income people, such as public transit or 
potential pricing credits. 
Paying directly for road usage is actually more equitable and efficient, since 
users pay in proportion to the costs they impose. Uncharged facilities force everyone 
to pay (through congestion), including motorists who reduce their vehicle use. Paying 
directly gives individual consumers the savings that result when they drive less, 
providing a new opportunity to save money.  From a public welfare standpoint, under 
congestion conditions, everyone is worse off, whereas under an efficient system, 
society as a whole is better off.  Congestion is a public “bad” that the government has 




Services 2005).  Moreover, everyone wins with better air quality and increased 
mobility. 
As with any situation, there will be perceived winners and losers in regards to 
congestion pricing on the Capital Beltway.  Before implementation, these potential 
conditions must be considered and evaluated in order to possibly mitigate less-than-
positive scenarios.  Furthermore, significant public transit options must be improved 
before any such system can be implemented.  Without acceptable public 
transportation options for drivers, a congestion pricing system lacks true equity. 
5.4 Policy Limitations and Recommendations 
Politics can be the downfall of any congestion pricing initiative.  Without 
political support, no system can see the light of day.  As for the Capital Beltway, an 
entire-roadway congestion pricing system is far more feasible than, say, a cordon area 
surrounding Washington, D.C.  Due to the amount of travelers that enter the city for 
employment, a move like this would be seen as a commuter tax and fought hard by all 
suburban centers.  Unlike London or Stockholm, the Capital Beltway region is 
encompassed by three jurisdictions (Maryland, Virginia, and the District of 
Columbia), in addition to the federal government.  While politics may be a hurdle, it 
is one worth handling for the long-term societal good. 
In terms of policy suggestions specifically for this study, opinions were 
gathered from Patrick DeCorla-Souza, the Team Leader for Highway Pricing and 
System Analysis in the Office of Transportation Policy Studies and the Program 
Manager for the Urban Partnership Program at the Federal Highway Administration 




suggested that it would probably make more sense to start pricing the entire freeway 
system in the area – not just the Capital Beltway; a key to success with congestion 
pricing systems is the comprehensiveness of the pricing network.  To make the 
system truly work, other taxation should be eliminated, as the system revenue would 
hopefully be enough to cover these costs – this way, the public would be far more 
accepting of road pricing.  Additionally, finding funding sources for expanded transit 
options, telecommuting programs, and things of that nature are critical steps towards 
congestion pricing.  Finally, there are a few political selling points that should be 
addressed.  These are as follows: 
• The congestion pricing system is a replacement of the current taxation 
system 
• The system is fair – drivers who use more pay more 
• The system is efficient – travel delay is decreased or eliminated, the 
economy is boosted, and freeway productivity loss is avoided 
• The system is good for the environment – lowered emissions through less 
idling, positive global warming effect, etc. 
Martin Richards, an expert on the London pricing scheme, addressed some 
key issues at the Transportation Research Board (TRB) 2008 Annual Meeting.  For a 
successful system, the media and general public must be well-informed in advance of 
any implementation.  If this aspect is lacking, the public and media will come to 
incorrect conclusions about the system and it then becomes easier for those opposed 
to propagate misleading information – thus, rational discussion about the topic is 




providing a clear execution pathway, strong leadership that won’t back down or 
retract, and total and consistent commitment to the cause. 
Lastly, there are multiple perspectives that should be reflected in any 
congestion pricing system to ensure effectiveness and fairness – those of the users, 
traffic authority, and society.  The proposed system in this study addresses these 
perspectives, but further examination should be done for each.  An outline of 
recommended principles for each perspective is as follows (Victoria Transport Policy 
Institute 2007): 
 From the perspective of the user, a congestion pricing system should be easy 
to understand, convenient (i.e. does not require vehicles to stop at toll booths), viable 
transportation options should exist (i.e. alternative modes, travel times, routes, and 
destinations), multiple easy-to-use payment options should exist (i.e. cash, prepaid 
card, credit card, etc.), charges should be evident before a trip is undertaken, and the 
privacy of users should be assured. 
 From the perspective of the traffic authority, a congestion pricing system 
should consider traffic impacts (vehicles should not be required to stop at toll booths 
or delay traffic in other ways), efficient and equitable charges should reflect true user 
costs, the system should be effective in reducing traffic congestion and other 
transportation problems by changing travel behavior, occasional users and different 
vehicle types should be easily accommodated, minimal incorrect charges should 
occur, minimal fraud or non-compliance should occur, there should be a positive 




disruption during any development phase, and the implementation should be available 
for expansion, as needed. 
 From the perspective of society, a congestion pricing system should have 
positive net benefits when all impacts are considered, political acceptability (i.e. 
public perception of fairness and value), positive environmental impacts, and the 
same integrated charging system should be able to be used to pay other public service 
fees (i.e. parking, public transit, etc.). 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the logistics behind implementing a congestion pricing system 
for the Capital Beltway were presented.  Effective between weekday hours of 6AM 
and 10AM and 2PM and 7PM, the morning and evening peak periods on I-495 are 
included.  As noted, potential future iterations of a pricing system could expand the 
hours of operation or switch to 24-hour pricing.  In this study, the charges attempt to 
cause roadway users to equal their contributed congestion costs to the traffic stream. 
While other implementations are bogged down with exemptions and 
discounts, the conditions of this study were relatively straightforward.  Transit and 
emergency vehicles will be granted free access and low-income users may be eligible 
for travel credits.  Multiple payment options via the Internet, mail, and telephone will 
be available to travelers.  System revenue will be first utilized to cover start-up and 
ongoing costs.  Afterward, excess revenue will be applied to supporting public transit 
and road improvements, with public transit being a priority. 
Equity considerations must be taken extremely seriously (through revenue 




congestion pricing system to be taken seriously, citizens must believe that the system 
is a replacement of the current taxation system, the system is fair (i.e. drivers who use 
more pay more), the system is efficient (i.e. travel delay is decreased or eliminated, 
the economy is boosted, and freeway productivity loss is avoided), and that the 
system is good for the environment.  Additionally, pricing on only I-495 is not a 
likely option.  If pricing were to exist on roadways in the Washington, D.C. area, it 
should be implemented on all major roadways (I-495, I-270, I-70, I-95, etc.). 
The financial implications for the proposed I-459 congestion pricing system 




Chapter 6: Financial Implications 
6.1 Costs 
In the following sections, estimated cost information for the proposed Capital 
Beltway congestion pricing system is provided. 
6.1.2 Scenarios Examined 
Two potential open road tolling/electronic toll collection setups were 
considered in this study.  Both involved overhead gantry systems, but differed in cost 
due to the layout of the gantries.  The premise of this system is that vehicles are 
“tracked” at each gantry and if they don’t reach the next gantry within a certain time 
(i.e. they exit I-495), their charge is calculated – this amount of time will have to 
reflect possible congestion or other occurrences and is not the focus of this thesis.  
The two strategies were as follows: 
• Gantry setup directly on I-495 – across all four lanes in each direction 
• Gantry setup on entrance and exit ramps to/from I-495 – gantries ranging 
from 1- to 3-lanes for each entrance and exit ramp 







Figure 6-1: I-495 Gantry Setup (Direct) 
 
Figure 6-2: I-495 Gantry Setup (Entrance and Exit Ramps) 
Using these two layout scenarios, cost information was estimated.  The 
Research and Innovative Technology Administration of USDOT operates a cost-




cost estimates of not only gantries, but also all facets of project implementation for 
HOT lanes – the cost estimate aspects of design, construction, maintenance, and 
operation were extrapolated from their estimates for the components necessary for the 
proposed congestion pricing system on I-495.  Table 6-1 presents the system cost 
breakdown for I-495 extrapolated from the USDOT database.  Also factored into this 
table are the yearly operating costs, which will be discussed later.  These categories 
are used for both potential scenarios. 
6.1.2.1 Gantry Setup on I-495 
Using a gantry setup directly on I-495 entails, on average, four 4-lane gantries 
at each interchange.  The reasoning behind this is that gantries cannot be placed only 
before or after entrances and exits – they must be placed both before and after these 
points in order to account for all vehicles.  Using roadmaps, satellite imagery, and 
general knowledge of the region, it is estimated that a total of 166 4-lane gantries 
would be required for this scenario – 106 in Maryland and 60 in Virginia.  As some 
calculations deal with a per-lane basis, this equates to 664 total lanes – 424 in 
Maryland and 240 in Virginia. 
Using these costs, the proposed system setup on I-495 with gantries directly 





Table 6-1: I-495 System Costs 
Category Description Notes Cost ($) 
Gantry structure - 4 lanes - 75000 
Gantry structure - 3 lanes - 65000 
Gantry structure - 2 lanes - 60000 
Gantry structure - 1 lane - 30000 
Toll & communication equipment building 1 per exit 30000 
Electronic toll collection (ETC) reader 1 per gantry 4000 
Transceiver 1 per gantry 3500 
ETC reader controller 1 per gantry 4000 
ETC power supply 1 per gantry 250 
Camera 1 per gantry 3500 
Camera power supply 1 per gantry 250 
Image processor per state 6500 
Optical character recognition (OCR) server per state 7000 
OCR software/interface per state 60000 
Vehicle detection sensor 1 per lane/per gantry 4500 
Software, interface support, engineering support, and 
documentation per state 12000 
Lane controller 1 per gantry 12500 
Lane cabinet and electronics 1 per gantry 6500 
Lane software per state 200000 
Variable message sign (approximately one per exit) 1 per exit 60000 
Fixed overhead signs on gantry 1 per gantry 10000 
Network equipment/connections per state 200000 
Power - breaker panel 1 per exit 2000 
Power - UPS & battery cabinet 1 per exit 5000 
Power - conduit/wiring 1 per exit 20000 
Power - disconnect & bypass switch 1 per gantry 3500 
Power - generator unit 1 per exit 6500 
Power - generator wiring 1 per exit 2000 
Contingencies 25% of above total 
Mobilization 10% of subtotal 
Construction 
Construction total All of the above 
Design Engineering 
and Administration 
Design engineering and admin 20% of construction total 
Host server and data storage per state 150000 
Database software and licenses per state 50000 
Host software per state 200000 
System applications software per state 400000 
Maintenance management per state 200000 
Various other computer equipment per state 200000 
Installation and configuration support per state 20000 
Transponders (100,000 free units to commuters) split 50% 2500000 
Customer service center per state 2000000 
Capital Cost for 
Operations 
Capital cost for operations total All of the above 
Maintenance costs (per year) 10% of capital costs 
Transaction processing charge ($0.12 per transaction) - 
85,000,000 transactions per year 
split 50% 10200000 Yearly Costs 




6.1.2.2 Gantry Setup on Entrance and Exit Ramps 
Using a gantry setup on I-495 entrance and exit ramps entails gantries ranging 
from 1- to 3-lanes on each entrance and exit ramp to account for all vehicles entering 
or exiting the roadway.  Using roadmaps, satellite imagery, and general knowledge of 
the region, it is estimated that the following gantries would be required for this 
scenario: 
Table 6-2: Gantry Totals on Entrance and Exit Ramps 
1-lane 226 
2-lane 15 Total 
3-lane 3 
1-lane 139 
2-lane 7 Maryland 
3-lane 3 
1-lane 87 
2-lane 8 Virginia 
3-lane 0 
As some calculations deal with a per-lane basis, this equates to 265 total lanes – 162 
in Maryland and 103 in Virginia. 
Using these costs, the proposed system setup on I-495 with gantries on I-495 
entrance and exit ramps would be estimated at $53,732,550 – $ 31,968,075 in 
Maryland and $21,764,475 in Virginia. 
6.1.3 Chosen Scenario 
Based on the cost estimates provided in the previous sections, a gantry setup 
on I-495 entrance and exit ramps is the most cost-effective option.  This presents a 






In order to calculate revenue, the assumed flow during each hour of the 
congestion pricing strategy is based on average flow across all detectors providing 
data for that hour in 2007.  The optimization model was run using these average flows 
in order to determine the new flows that can be expected during each hour to provide 
revenue estimates.  Since no I-495 data is collected on average miles driven per 
vehicle on I-495 during each peak period, National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) 
data were analyzed to obtain estimates.  Based on the NHTS 2001 trip information for 
the United States, the data were split into 1-mile increments ranging from one mile to 
thirty-two miles.  This is based on the assumptions of a distance of one mile between 
any two exits on the Capital Beltway and the fact that people will hypothetically 
travel along one-half of the 64-mile long roadway, at a maximum.  Even though this 
method is not entirely precise, it is far more realistic in terms of potential revenue 
estimation than splitting up mileage level groups evenly based on traffic flow.  Figure 























Figure 6-3: Distribution of Trip Distances 
Source: NHTS 2001 
In applying these trip distribution frequencies to the Capital Beltway, many 
assumptions were made.  First, traffic in the Washington, D.C. area was assumed 
similar to the nationwide traffic represented in the NHTS data.  Additionally, it was 
assumed that one-way trips on I-495 have the same trip distribution frequencies as 
full trips (from beginning to end) at the national level.  This is a large assumption, due 
to the fact that travel on the Capital Beltway is only a portion of the commute 
experienced by travelers.  Regardless of the number of assumptions, national trip 
distribution frequencies provide a much better estimation than uniform frequency 
estimates for each distance. 
By using the applicable hourly charges presented in this study and the 
corresponding hourly flows and frequency estimates, daily revenue can be calculated.  




hour, the hourly flow on I-495 averages 1,598 PCE/lane/hour.  Once congestion 
pricing is implemented, the hourly flow is expected to drop to 1,550 PCE/lane/hour 
and the associated charge is $0.05 per PCE per mile.  The frequency of vehicles 
traveling 1.5 miles on I-495 is 0.099.  This results in 153 vehicles paying $0.05 per 
mile for 1.5 miles – a total of roughly $11.48 for that portion of traffic (traveling in 
one direction) during that hour.  Similar calculations are then made for each of the 32 
mileage ranges for the same hour and then for every operating hour afterwards.  Daily 
and yearly revenue estimates can then be obtained. 
The total revenue per day for I-495 (in both directions) is estimated to be 
$60,282.63.  A total of 251 charging days per year equates to a yearly revenue 
estimate of $15,130,939.61. 
6.3 Break-Even Points/Payoff Calculations 
In order to determine system break-even points and payoff calculations, the 
system costs were examined over a 50-year period.  Taking into account the yearly 
costs of operation and maintenance, along with a 10-year equipment lifespan, these 
yearly amounts were determined.  After 10 years, it is assumed that 50% of the initial 
system costs will be required to update the system, as some existing structure remains 
usable.  After 20 years, however, a complete system overhaul is required.  Table 6-3 
shows the yearly cumulative costs for the I-495 congestion pricing system.  Similarly, 
cumulative revenue estimates were made over a 50-year period (Table 6-4), assuming 
constant yearly revenue.  Payoff is equal to cumulative revenue divided by 
cumulative cost for a given year and all estimates are kept in 2007 dollars to provide 




Table 6-3: I-495 System 50-Year Cumulative Costs 
Description Year Cumulative Cost (2007 $) 
Setup costs - 53732550 
After 1 year of operation 1 64826550 
After 2 years of operation 2 75920550 
After 3 years of operation 3 87014550 
After 4 years of operation 4 98108550 
After 5 years of operation 5 109202550 
After 6 years of operation 6 120296550 
After 7 years of operation 7 131390550 
After 8 years of operation 8 142484550 
After 9 years of operation 9 153578550 
After 10 years of operation (equipment lifespan) 10 164672550 
After 11 years of operation 11 202632825 
After 12 years of operation 12 213726825 
After 13 years of operation 13 224820825 
After 14 years of operation 14 235914825 
After 15 years of operation 15 247008825 
After 16 years of operation 16 258102825 
After 17 years of operation 17 269196825 
After 18 years of operation 18 280290825 
After 19 years of operation 19 291384825 
After 20 years of operation (2 equipment lifespans) 20 302478825 
After 21 years of operation 21 367305375 
After 22 years of operation 22 378399375 
After 23 years of operation 23 389493375 
After 24 years of operation 24 400587375 
After 25 years of operation 25 411681375 
After 26 years of operation 26 422775375 
After 27 years of operation 27 433869375 
After 28 years of operation 28 444963375 
After 29 years of operation 29 456057375 
After 30 years of operation (3 equipment lifespans) 30 467151375 
After 31 years of operation 31 505111650 
After 32 years of operation 32 516205650 
After 33 years of operation 33 527299650 
After 34 years of operation 34 538393650 
After 35 years of operation 35 549487650 
After 36 years of operation 36 560581650 
After 37 years of operation 37 571675650 
After 38 years of operation 38 582769650 
After 39 years of operation 39 593863650 
After 40 years of operation (4 equipment lifespans) 40 604957650 
After 41 years of operation 41 669784200 
After 42 years of operation 42 680878200 
After 43 years of operation 43 691972200 
After 44 years of operation 44 703066200 
After 45 years of operation 45 714160200 
After 46 years of operation 46 725254200 
After 47 years of operation 47 736348200 
After 48 years of operation 48 747442200 
After 49 years of operation 49 758536200 





Table 6-4: I-495 System 50-Year Cumulative Revenue 
Year Annual Revenue (2007 $) Cumulative Revenue (2007 $) Payoff % 
1 15130939.61 15130939.61 0.233 
2 15130939.61 30261879.23 0.399 
3 15130939.61 45392818.84 0.522 
4 15130939.61 60523758.46 0.617 
5 15130939.61 75654698.07 0.693 
6 15130939.61 90785637.68 0.755 
7 15130939.61 105916577.30 0.806 
8 15130939.61 121047516.91 0.850 
9 15130939.61 136178456.53 0.887 
10 15130939.61 151309396.14 0.919 
11 15130939.61 166440335.76 0.821 
12 15130939.61 181571275.37 0.850 
13 15130939.61 196702214.98 0.875 
14 15130939.61 211833154.60 0.898 
15 15130939.61 226964094.21 0.919 
16 15130939.61 242095033.83 0.938 
17 15130939.61 257225973.44 0.956 
18 15130939.61 272356913.05 0.972 
19 15130939.61 287487852.67 0.987 
20 15130939.61 302618792.28 1.000 
21 15130939.61 317749731.90 0.865 
22 15130939.61 332880671.51 0.880 
23 15130939.61 348011611.13 0.893 
24 15130939.61 363142550.74 0.907 
25 15130939.61 378273490.35 0.919 
26 15130939.61 393404429.97 0.931 
27 15130939.61 408535369.58 0.942 
28 15130939.61 423666309.20 0.952 
29 15130939.61 438797248.81 0.962 
30 15130939.61 453928188.42 0.972 
31 15130939.61 469059128.04 0.929 
32 15130939.61 484190067.65 0.938 
33 15130939.61 499321007.27 0.947 
34 15130939.61 514451946.88 0.956 
35 15130939.61 529582886.50 0.964 
36 15130939.61 544713826.11 0.972 
37 15130939.61 559844765.72 0.979 
38 15130939.61 574975705.34 0.987 
39 15130939.61 590106644.95 0.994 
40 15130939.61 605237584.57 1.000 
41 15130939.61 620368524.18 0.926 
42 15130939.61 635499463.79 0.933 
43 15130939.61 650630403.41 0.940 
44 15130939.61 665761343.02 0.947 
45 15130939.61 680892282.64 0.953 
46 15130939.61 696023222.25 0.960 
47 15130939.61 711154161.87 0.966 
48 15130939.61 726285101.48 0.972 
49 15130939.61 741416041.09 0.977 





This revenue estimation is used, along with other potential scenarios involving 
yearly revenue growth, to plot system payoff potential over time.  Figure 6-4 
showcases the results. 
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Figure 6-4: Yearly I-495 System Payoff 
Looking at system payoff time based on different estimates of yearly revenue 
growth produces interesting results.  The following can be seen: 
• Assuming constant revenue, the system pays for itself every 20 years, but 
doesn't ever become profitable 
• Assuming a 0.5% growth in revenue every year, the system becomes 
profitable after 27 years 
• Assuming a 1.0% growth in revenue every year, the system becomes 




• Assuming a 1.5% growth in revenue every year, the system becomes 
profitable after 15 years 
• Assuming a 2.0% growth in revenue every year, the system becomes 
profitable after 14 years 
• Assuming a 2.5% growth in revenue every year, the system becomes 
profitable after 12 years 
As the proposed system at least breaks even with no ongoing debt, it is in the 
common good. 
6.4 Assumptions and Conclusions 
As with other sections of this study, certain assumptions were required to 
obtain cost and revenue estimates.  First, HOT project estimates from the USDOT 
Research and Innovative Technology Administration were assumed representative of 
cost estimates for this congestion pricing system.  Implementing a HOT lane is 
different than an entire-facility system, so this fact was taken into account with the 
cost estimates.  Secondly, for cumulative cost estimates, 50% rebuild costs were 
assumed at 10 years and complete system rebuild costs were assumed at 20 years – 
this was based on the fact that the system equipment has a projected lifespan of 10 
years.  Lastly, NHTS trip data was assumed representative of one-way trips on I-495.  
This data was utilized assuming a distance of one mile between any two exits on I-
495 and the fact that people will hypothetically travel one-half of the 64-mile long 
Beltway, as a maximum.  As stated previously, even though this method is not 
entirely precise, it is far more realistic in terms of potential revenue estimation than 




Due to the fact that charges have been estimated to be lower than previous 
research indicates, revenue figures have also been underestimated.  In light of this 
situation, a congestion pricing system in the Washington, D.C. area could potentially 
exhibit faster turnaround and pay for itself in fewer years.  Excess revenue could then 




Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations 
7.1 Summary of Results 
Road users must be held accountable for the true cost of highways.  As travel 
is free on the Capital Beltway surrounding Washington, D.C., there is no current 
financial incentive to utilize public transportation, alter the timing of necessary trips, 
reduce unnecessary trips, or increase carpooling.  This thesis aimed to hold users of I-
495 accountable for their role in congestion by calculating appropriate congestion 
charges on a per-mile basis.  The goal of this thesis was to calculate the appropriate 
charges required for users of I-495 in order to fulfill their portion of congestion costs. 
This goal was reached within the study, as a model was developed from 
existing data on the Capital Beltway that showcases traffic characteristics that cause 
congestion, necessary charges for vehicle users to realize the congestion costs that 
their vehicles impose on the rest of the traffic stream were calculated, and potential 
financial implications (costs and revenue) that would be associated with congestion 
pricing were examined. 
AM peak period charges ranging from $0.05 to $0.08 per PCE per mile cause 
drivers to realize their contribution to congestion and charges ranging from $0.03 to 
$0.08 per PCE per mile in the PM peak period accomplish the same.  Tables breaking 
these charges down across FHWA vehicle classifications were shown in Chapter 4, 
along with summaries of anticipated traffic composition after implementing a 
congestion pricing system on I-495.  These estimates are lower than those based on 




be between $0.08 and $0.50 per mile.  This discrepancy in charging amounts can 
most likely be associated with additional factors that were not taken into account in 
this study.  Chapter 6 showed that the proposed system with constant revenue will be 
able to pay for itself with no yearly subsidy required.  If revenue increases are 
obtained, however, the system will both pay for itself and provide excess funds for 
use in transit improvements or minor roadway improvements.  Additionally, since the 
charging estimates set forth in this thesis may be considered conservative 
approximations, a congestion pricing system on the Capital Beltway may be more 
cost effective than this study shows, with the system paying for itself in less time. 
7.2 Conclusions 
As mentioned previously, the proposed congestion system for the Capital 
Beltway is a "second-best" solution – containing charges varying on an hourly scale 
instead of smoothly time-varying charges.  We are a long way from a potential "first-
best" solution, with congestion charges varying in real-time based on actual 
conditions, as such a system is not practical at this point in time.  Based on this fact, 
any solution is better than no solution – a Washington, D.C. area congestion pricing 
system needs to start somewhere.  This study provides a good building block to the 
positives of congestion pricing, but there is still much ground to be covered. 
Although this study is a, more-or-less, hypothetical scenario, hopefully it can 
pave the way for future discussion and research into facility-wide per-mile pricing 
systems in the United States.  Based on the results of this study, the charges necessary 
for people to realize their congestion costs are not exorbitant.  Education is key to 




something like road usage can be more beneficial for society.  Proponents of 
congestion pricing must increase their public education efforts in hopes to gain 
further support.  Through all of this, we must all also realize that there is not one 
perfect solution for congestion management – all available options must be 
considered, including transit advancements and pricing. 
7.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
In closing, as there remains much ground for future research, the following 
suggestions are made: 
1. The entire regional freeway system should be examined in light of this 
study, not just the Capital Beltway – network comprehensiveness is a 
critical component of a successful congestion pricing strategy 
2. Based on the lack of data for this study, more functioning traffic detectors 
are needed to collect valid speed, volume, and vehicle classification data – 
new sensor installations along with updates to the existing sensor network 
are necessary to gather more precise data.  Additionally, data collection 
standards should exist for comprehensiveness between jurisdictions.  In 
terms of costs, discussion with various transportation professionals has 
provided that installation costs for a fixed sensor network are estimated 
between $7,500 and $20,000 per site.  The range in cost is due primarily to 
the extent to which existing infrastructure can be reused.  Reuse of 
existing poles, sign trusses, and existing power and communications feeds 




infrastructure, though more expensive, may prove to be the more cost 
effective option overall. 
3. Congestion charging based on smaller time increments (or even real-time) 
would require data in much smaller increments instead of the hourly 
aggregations utilized in this study – various charging options should be 
evaluated. 
4. Instead of utilizing NHTS data to estimate one-way trips during AM and 
PM peaks on I-495, surveys could be conducted in order to have a more 
precise estimate of revenue possibilities. 
5. This study focused on gantries, cameras, and license plate reader 
technology, as costs were able to be obtained.  Different technology may 
be cheaper and easier to install – for example, charges related to mileage 
driven in a priced region may be assessed by utilizing in-vehicle units 
(IVUs), such as those in-place in Singapore, with no need for gantries or 
cameras. 
6. User value of time and vehicle operating cost estimates could be evaluated 
more precisely instead relying on FHWA estimates – future surveys and 
experiments could be conducted to gather this data. 
7. While this study focuses on charging across all lanes on the Capital 
Beltway, a similar analysis could be accomplished using a HOT lane 




8. Environmental costs such as air pollution caused by idling vehicles were 
not considered in this thesis – special attention should be focused on 
various environmental costs for future work. 
9. A variation of this study could be focused on finding the number of 
vehicles that need to be removed from a traffic stream at a given time in 
order to reach a certain level of service (LOS), average speed, or some 
other performance metric.  Using a revised version of this model, 
































Figure A-1: Average Hourly Speed – Detector 90138 
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Figure A-3: Average Hourly Flow – Detector 90138 
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Figure A-5: Hourly Volume-to-Capacity Ratio – Detector 90138 
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Figure A-7: Average Hourly Speed by Year – Detector 90202 
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Figure A-9: Average Hourly Flow by Year – Detector 90202 
V/C Ratio - Link 90202



























































Figure A-11: Average Hourly Speed – Detector 90275 
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Figure A-13: Average Hourly Flow – Detector 90275 
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Figure A-15: Hourly Volume-to-Capacity Ratio – Detector 90275 
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Figure A-17: Average Hourly Speed by Year – Detector 190004 
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Figure A-19: Average Hourly Flow by Year – Detector 190004 
V/C Ratio - Link 190004
























































Figure A-21: Average Hourly Speed – Detector 190057 






















12AM 1AM 2AM 3AM 4AM 5AM 6AM 7AM 8AM 9AM 10AM 11AM
12PM 1PM 2PM 3PM 4PM 5PM 6PM 7PM 8PM 9PM 10PM 11PM
 

























Figure A-23: Average Hourly Flow – Detector 190057 
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